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                  PREFACE 
This work deals with the relationship between the political and 
managerial levels in the light of legislative reforms introduced during the 
last decade in the Italian public administration. 
The choice of this research topic is related to the requirement to combine 
my juridical background with skills and knowledge gained during the 
p.h.d. course.   
Firstly this work was developed trough a juridical analysis aimed to 
verify if the discipline  introduced by the reform is able to realize its 
goals. 
Secondly the analysis was enforced by using system dynamics 
methodology in order to evaluate if and to what extent the discipline has 
been able to ensure a greater autonomy to public manager. 
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In particular the work has been structured on four chapters, each chapter 
represents a paper presented at international conferences of public 
management to which I participated during the P.h.d. course. 
The first paper having the title “ the introduction of new public 
management principles in the Italian public sector “ was presented 
during the EPLO Workshop ( Athens February 2010); the second paper 
having the title “ on the relationship between the political and 
managerial levels in the Italian public administration reform” was 
presented during the EGPA Conference 2009 ( Malta, September 
2009);the third paper having the title “ the evaluation of public 
managers’ performances in the light of Italian public administration 
reform “ was accepted for the EGPA Conference 2010 ( Toulouse 
September 2010); the fourth paper having the title “ a system dynamics 
approach to evaluate the level of autonomy of  public managers” will be 
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presented at EURAM Conference 2011 will be held in Tallin on June 
2011. 
In the opening side the work analyzes the general reform process of 
European public administrations inspired by New Public Management 
principles and then it deals with the effects produced by the reform on 
the Italian public administration, focusing, in particular, on the 
relationship between the political and managerial levels. 
On this regard this work aimed to verify if the discipline introduced by 
the reform has been able to ensure a greater autonomy to public 
manager. 
The results of this research, that as above shown, has been developed 
analysing the content of previsions introduced by the reform and 
verifying their efficacy in increasing managers’ autonomy by using 
system dynamics methodology, shows that Italian legislator did not 
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realize its goal to ensure a greater autonomy to public manager in 
comparison to politicians. 
The contribution that this work aims to provide to the scientific debate 
in this topic is to outline the inadequacy of the discipline introduced by 
the reform and to suggest hypothesis of legislative innovation in order to 
ensure an effective autonomy to public manager so to realize fully the 
principle of functional separation between political and administrative 
levels. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
PRINCIPLES IN THE ITALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR  
 
 
Abstract 
Over the last few decades, the Italian public administration has 
undergone significant reform, which aimed to rectify the structural 
defects in the system, leading to inefficiency in public management and 
an improper allocation and utilization of resources. The Italian legislator, 
following the New Public Management guidelines, introduced private 
principles and instruments in the public field to improve the efficiency, 
effectiveness and financial stability of state enterprise.  
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In particular, one of the main innovations introduced in this field 
regarded the recognition of the principle of distinction between politics  
and administration and the transfer from a bureaucratic model based on 
norms to a managerial model based on performance. 
The reform has the aim of changing the traditional “weberian 
bureaucratic“ approach of the Italian public administration, in 
accordance with the “ New public management” principles. 
This reform process regarded also other European Countries that have 
undergone profound changes. As well as Italy, the reform process in 
these Countries was based on the principles of "New Public 
Management" which proclaims: an increased focus on results in terms of 
efficiency, effectiveness and quality of service by setting standards of 
productivity; an orientation towards citizens-consumers in terms of 
service quality and customer satisfaction; the introduction of market 
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mechanisms; a more strategic focus on the reinforcement of strategic 
capacity. 
This chapter is underpinned by analysis of the regulation introduced by 
the reform of the Italian public administration to observe whether its 
main objectives have been really achieved . It is also based on a 
comparative analysis of the effects produced by reforms in Italy and in 
other European Countries. Lastly this work aims to verify if it is  possible 
to outline a framework of convergence based on the principles of new 
public management.  
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Introduction 
The Italian public administration reform was carried out over the past 
decades on the basis of "new public management" principles. This 
innovation is geared towards the introduction into the public sector of 
private management instruments, with a view to improving efficiency, 
effectiveness and financial stability. These efforts aim to correct the 
structural deficiencies in the Italian system, which have generated 
inefficiency in public management and an improper allocation and use of 
resources. 
In particular, these innovations have affected several aspects of the 
public administration system, changing governance rules, introducing 
deregulation and a new perspective on the citizen’s roles and rights, 
implementing privatization and externalization, making provision for 
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institutional decentralization, changing decisional processes and 
organizational models and reforming accounting systems. 
These innovations also have the aim of prompting a shift from a 
bureaucratic model based on norms to a managerial model based on 
performance.  
This reform process in public administrations also involved many other 
European Countries that have undergone profound changes ; in these 
Countries the reform process was also based on the principles of "New 
Public Management". This does not mean that a complete uniformity of 
application has been found; on the contrary, in this regard, it is possible 
to highlight differences between one country and another. 
This chapter is based on an analysis of the reform process carried out in 
the Italian public sector to verify the results achieved . It also analyzes 
administrative evolution in European countries to see whether it is 
possible to single out a convergence, in the various European public 
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administrations, towards certain common principles inspired by New 
Public Management  ideas. 
 
1. New Public Management and modernization of public administration  
The public administration, in the last twenty years, has undergone 
profound changes linked to the altered socio-economic context of 
modern  post-industrial societies. 
Previously public organizations had an organizational and managerial 
structure on the lines of a bureaucratic model and did not possess the 
necessary capacity to deal with the new needs of the citizens. 
The rising complexity, the lack of financial resources and European 
politico-economic integration required a process of modernization in 
public administration. 
This process has affected : a) the managerial perspective ,taking public 
systems in the direction of new principles and instruments to be used in 
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the process of organizational, managerial and information system 
innovation; b) the political perspective, leading the public sector towards 
new forms of  legitimization c) the juridical perspective, prompting the 
public sector to acknowledge the social-economic changes in society by 
introducing a new legal framework to suit the new conditions. 
The above-mentioned reform process was based on the principles of 
"New Public Management".  
 
1.1 New Public Management principles 
The adoption of New Public Management has represented, over the last  
twenty years, one of the most significant events for the study and 
practice of public administration in most industrialised countries. This 
could be seen as an epochal evolution in the way the public sector is 
conceived, although doubts still exist regarding the components, the 
central characteristics and the definition itself. 
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In fact, the initials NPM represent a “wide-scale formula”, to which 
various meanings are attributed. These range from the general idea of 
“modernisation of the public sector” to the narrower meaning of 
rationalisation of the public administration. The NPM makes claims to 
being  universal; in fact, initiatives of the NPM type are common enough 
throughout the OCSE countries and have reached most Commonwealth 
countries, not to mention the ex-communist countries( Borins 1998; 
Hood 1991, 1995a:166-170). This does not mean that a complete 
uniformity of application has been found. On the contrary, in this regard 
it is possible to highlight differences between one country and another, 
since the profiles for modernisation range from complete openness 
towards market forces and privatisation (Great Britain), to a radical re-
planning of the public sector in line with the model of the private sector 
(New Zealand); from cases of rapid advance towards managerial running, 
to cases of co-existence with residual links with more traditional forms of 
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bureaucratic government in accordance with pre-defined rules (Japan, 
Germany, Austria) (Naschold 1996:19 ss.). A greater impact of NPM-type 
ideas has also been noted in Anglo-Saxon contexts (though with internal 
differences) when compared to eastern regions of continental Europe( 
Ferlie, et al. 1996:15-20). This could quite reasonably be due to the long 
tradition based on the predominance, in most European countries, of a 
school of thought  of a juridical nature with regard to the public 
administration. 
NPM  should not be understood as a continual, uniform push towards a 
common public sector model; if anything it might be seen as a global 
change permitting differentiated local solutions, i.e. a widespread shift, as 
regards convergence, towards a limited variety of new and more uniform 
ways of government by the public administration. 
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In other words, the “global” movement is rendered compatible with a 
certain number of differentiated models, which, in their individual cases, 
reflect the way in which the following variables combine and interact:  
. specific components introduced within each model and the order of 
priorities assigned to them; 
• the speed of the reform  movement (which depends on the vitality and 
degree of convergence of the guiding forces); 
• the internal and external conditions determining the context in which 
the process of modernisation has to develop; 
• the approach taken in order to complete each model. 
In spite of the above-mentioned observations, which aim to mitigate 
assumptions about the universality or globalisation of NPM, it is, at the 
same time, possible to try to extrapolate a table for general reference. 
The basic features of the NPM ideas might be synthesized into three 
fundamental elements(Osborne e Gaebler 1993:277): 
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1. Re-definition of the boundaries between State and market through 
privatisation and externalisation. 
2. Re-formulation of the macro-structure of the public sector through 
the delegating of state functions (at the lower organisational level) to 
within the macro-structure (this phenomenon could be denominated 
institutional decentralisation or external decentralisation). 
3. Re-definition of operational rules characterising the way in which the 
public sector carries out its functions and achieves its goals. This third 
component might be considered as characterised by seven main sub-
components:  
3.1. Toning down of the ties conditioning the public sector as compared 
to the private sector. This phenomenon includes the transformation of 
state economic bodies into limited companies and might, generally 
speaking, be called formal privatisation;  
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3.2. Re-structuring of activities/businesses in the public administration, 
so that they are operating “on a commercial basis”, i.e. in a state of 
equilibrium between costs and revenue (corporatization);  
3.3. State competition (internal market);  
3.4. Devolution of functions and competences from the centre towards 
outermost units or the lowest organizational levels within every entity in 
the public sector (this phenomenon might be called internal 
decentralisation); 
 3.5. Re-definition of the administrative machine;  
3.6. Deregulation of the functioning of economic and social systems;  
3.7. Re-definition of citizens’ roles and rights. 
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2. The modernization process in the Italian public sector  
Modernization of the public sector in Italy started later and at a slower 
pace than in other countries (such as the United Kingdom, Australia and 
New Zealand) and has only started to speed up in the last decade.  
In particular the modernization process has impinged on the following 
aspects of the public administration system.  
a) It has been changed the governance rules, through a redistribution of 
powers between the different levels of government; reforming the 
political system through the adoption of the majority system and, finally, 
considering the third sector as a relevant social actor.   
b) It has been introduced deregulation and a new perspective on citizens’ 
roles and rights. 
Deregulation initiatives have only been activated on a wide scale in the 
last few years. In terms of deregulation the idea is to carry out a swift 
thinning-out of existing legislation (notable for its size, detail and 
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confusion). The process, which has only just been activated, is based 
principally on the following elements: 
• It aims to involve the various levels of government (State, Regions, 
local enterprise);  
• Parliament must establish areas of activity, where the greatest priority 
needs to be given to deregulation;  
• Parliament retains its function of approving certain basic norms, 
which it is thought might be better decreed at the national level;  
• The remaining activity of deregulation (assuming it is necessary) and 
its implementation will be delegated to state administration, to 
independent supervising and regulating authorities, to the Regions and 
local bodies, in relation to their respective institutional competences;  
• A great number of proceedings, pertaining to a vast range of branches 
of activity, were instigated following the initiation of simplification and 
thinning-out procedures. 
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Particular emphasis is given to structural reform of administrative 
processes, so that these are guaranteed to businesses, organisations or 
individual citizens: 
• swiftness and certainty of reply in answer to requests for information or 
supply of services; •greater responsibility on the part of public employees 
(to whom pecuniary sanctions might be applied, so that in the event of a 
delayed or unmotivated execution of a procedure the citizen might be 
compensated); 
• transparency of administrative operations. 
The juridical problems of deregulation are contiguous to measures in 
which issues of an essentially operational/managerial nature are made 
evident. Here we are referring, on the one hand, to the wholesale 
adoption of service-charters geared towards facilitating access to services 
and information and stimulating social control of public management 
and its performance. On the other hand, the reforms we are taking into 
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consideration are openly aiming to boost the citizen’s participation in the 
defining processes of these charters and in monitoring the results. Again, 
so that these arrangements might be effective, it is necessary to introduce 
well-devised operative mechanisms and adopt managerial tools aiming to 
foster quality of service, involvement of the client and achievement of 
results. A primary initiative in the reformulation of regulations relating 
to administrative procedures, in terms of better information, opportunity 
for access to services and transparency, was carried forward through law 
no.241/1990.  
c) It has been implemented privatization and externalization.  
The privatisation process started at the beginning of the 1990s, with the 
formal privatisation of the Casse di Risparmio and all other public banks 
(law no.218/1990).  
The privatisation process proceeded slowly, in spite of the critical 
importance for the nation of its two major goals, i.e.:  
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• contributing to the development of the financial system and the Stock 
Market; 
• contributing to the re-balancing of public financing, whose deficit was 
already a very serious problem in the early 1990s. Naturally, the process 
was (and continues to be) accompanied by a heated debate over the 
“classic” questions of more convenient ways of launching the said 
privatisation  (Anselmi 1994; Berti 1998; Bianchi 1994; Clarich 1994): 
• the options between a model on the lines of the public company 
(British experience) and the noyau dur (French experience);  
. recourse to the golden-share model with the objective of the State’s 
maintaining special rights of control of privatised public services;  
• the decision to institute supervising and regulating authorities for 
public services. 
The law regarding privatisation (no.474/1994) chose to favour the public 
company model (although in several important instan
28 
 
noyau dur was applied). The golden-share solution was eventually 
adopted and was followed by the decision to institute independent 
supervising and regulating authorities for public services. 
As opposed  to privatisation,  the externalisation  ( which consist on the 
delegation of public services supply to private market ) is came about , 
and continues to be verified, without any explicit legislative reform. 
Above all, this is affecting local bodies (including local health units – 
aziende sanitarie locali) as is indirectly demonstrated by the gradual 
reduction in expenditure on personnel as compared to that on purchasing 
goods and services. This evolution is, moreover, partly and more 
specifically caused by the recurring restrictions on taking on personnel 
imposed on local authorities by decisions at the intermediate level. 
d) It has been made provision for institutional decentralization and a 
substantial delegating of functions from the Central State to the Regions .  
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Decree no. 59/1997  and constitutional reform in 2001 introduced a sort 
of “administrative federalism”, in other words, the most wide-ranging 
delegating by the State, of functions, to the Regions and local 
administration. The principle of subsidization was affirmed as a basic 
criterion regulating relations between the various levels of government. 
Only a very limited number of functions were to remain under the 
direction of State administration. In their turn, Regional administrations 
were forced to delegate to local bodies all those functions that might be 
better exercised at the local level, in line with the same principle of 
subsidization. This fundamental decision was supported by the ordaining 
of a certain number of operational criteria as guide-lines for the 
delegation of functions (globality, efficiency, economizing).Together 
with substantial privatisation and externalisation, institutional 
decentralisation aims to guide public administration towards the idea of a 
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e) It has been reformed accounting systems, ranging from legitimacy 
preventive controls to controls based on the evaluation of management 
performance.  
The 1990s witnessed important changes in the structure of public sector 
accounting. The fundamental stages were:  
• reform of the health system, approved in 1992, entailing the adoption 
of economic accountancy on the part of local health units (aziende 
sanitarie locali) and the abandoning of financial accountancy(Marcon e 
Panozzo 1998); 
• wide-ranging reform of the local authorities carried forward in 
successive phases starting in the early 1990s, led to important changes in 
the accounting system of local bodies, including the introduction of a 
performance budget (denominated executive management plan) based 
around certain objectives, programmes and resources(Marcon 1996, 
1997). Another aspect was the adopting of “economic” (= 
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economic/patrimonial or general) accountancy, side-by-side with, and 
backed up by traditional financial accountancy;  
• reform of State Accounting System (1997). Among other things, this 
deals with re-planning the budget structure in accordance with the 
organizational structure, which is organised in such a way as to open the 
way towards a budget crafted for centres of responsibility. Another 
cardinal aspect is the differentiation between content and structure in 
the balance, in agreement with the informational needs of the principal 
actors (Parliament, on the one hand, ministers and managers on the 
other), analogically with the balances of local bodies. The framework is 
completed by the introduction of instruments of managerial control (as a 
system of analytic accountancy on the part of the cost-centres) and a link 
between resources/results and the management’s budget goals. 
Taken as a whole, the above-mentioned series of accounting reforms 
reflects the strategic change that is characterising the public sector’s 
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decision-making processes. In fact, the acceptance of a new relationship 
between politics and administration and the principle of  managing for 
results, requires a transformation in accounting information. In the 
previous set-up the decision-making processes were of a centralised type 
and controls were of a legal-formal type, whereas the basic function of 
the budget was one of  authorisation. On the contrary, the new set-up is 
characterised by decentralised responsibility, wide-ranging delegation of 
authority to management and the adoption of efficiency-effectiveness 
checks. 
On the other hand, as regards control-system initiatives the synthesis of 
the most significant initiatives of an NPM type taking place in Italy over 
the last twenty years has greatly emphasised the emergence of new 
instruments and mechanisms of government (among the various aspects). 
First of all, the entire Italian public administration was hit by a change in 
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the philosophy and functions of checking. Under these labels the 
elements can be grouped as follows: 
• Shift from preventive checks of legitimacy to subsequent checks of 
results.  
• The adoption of the principle, on the basis of which, results of the 
assessment process should influence the allocation of public resources, in 
accordance with a system of prizes and sanctions based on merit. 
Consequently, a change in checking objectives was introduced, as well as 
a change in the actual nature of the checking instruments utilised. The 
shift from traditional monitoring of expenditure to monitoring of costs, 
output and outcome, belongs within this category, as do adopting a 
system of assessing performance and adopting periodic reports on 
efficiency, effectiveness and economizing. 
f) It has been changed decisional processes and organizational models, 
through the introduction of those operating mechanisms needed to bring 
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about more performance-oriented management in public administration( 
Bianchi, 2004).  
In particular, the main innovation introduced in this field regarded the 
recognition of the principle of distinguishing between politics and 
administration, the transfer from a bureaucratic model based on norms to 
a managerial model based on performance and,  lastly,  the privatization 
of the employee relationship in the public sector. 
The new relationship between politics and administration necessitated 
providing politicians with orientation skills and public executives with 
managerial skills in order to avoid political interference and to fully 
achieve managerial accountability  in the sphere of management 
(Marcon 1996, 1997; Mussari 1994a).  
This is the principal element which distinguishes the old conception of 
public administration from the new. In fact, the previous decision-
making process was plainly managed by politicians, while executives 
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could not be rendered accountable for their activities. The new model, 
on the other hand, envisages public executives with greater managerial 
autonomy, and at the same it implies that managers have full 
responsibility for results achieved in the execution of their duties.  
The innovation was first implemented through legislative decree n. 29 
/93, which stipulated a clear distribution of skills between politicians 
(orientation competences) and executives (management competences) 
and modified the hierarchical relationship between them through the 
elimination of powers which allowed politicians to influence managerial 
activity. The objectives of the reform were finally implemented by the 
legislative decree 80/98, which extended the innovations to all 
managerial positions, and by the legislative decree 165/01, which 
coordinated and regulated all provisions concerning public employees. 
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 3. The current state of the reform in Italy  
Everything described in the previous paragraph justifies our affirmation 
that during the last twenty years the Italian path to modernisation of the 
public sector has been taking advantage of the entire “system of 
instruments” of an NPM type. The various elements making up the 
whole NPM structure have entered the Italian context in a more or less 
wholesale fashion and at several levels. Certain aspects regarding the 
motivations, temporal development, range and impact of the various 
initiatives have already been dealt with, but further consideration do 
now seem appropriate. 
Firstly, privatisation entered the picture at a later date and more 
gradually when compared to other components; in fact, it is seen as a 
controversial issue, since it gives rise to political conflict in both left and 
right-wing  parties, because of internal philosophies favouring the type of 
public sector with a significant position in the economy; this is without 
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counting political movements inspired by Catholic solidarity, and which 
strongly support State intervention. The need to streamline the public 
sector is widespread, because of enormous state expenditure and public 
debt(Messori, Padoan e Rossi 1998:118 ss.). 
Secondly, a toned-down version of corporatization was introduced ( 
Borgonovi, 2005). In most cases the costs incurred by those utilising the 
services do not reflect the principle of total cost, as postulated by the 
expression “management on a commercial basis”, which defines the 
concept of corporatization in rigorous fashion. This means that most 
“corporatized” public bodies continue to be widely financed by taxpayers 
and this also continues to hold true, though in decreasing mode, in sub-
sectors (such as health units and local bodies) where the process of 
corporatization has advanced on a wider scale. 
Thirdly, competition is still in its initial stages and only makes its 
presence felt in particular cases, such as certain partly-privatised public 
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services and health organisations (following the introduction of the 
principle of patient mobility compensation). 
Fourthly, a fresh surge of institutional decentralisation is now breaking 
ground under the previously-mentioned label of “administrative 
federalism”; but there are still great expectations of further development, 
witnessed by the on-going debate regarding fiscal federalism and 
federalism plain and simple. In fact, it is constitutional reforms that 
occupy end-of-century prime time in political debate. It is difficult to 
foresee the final outcome and implementation times, since these reform 
schedules group together not only the theme of institutional 
decentralisation, but also particularly complex questions, such as: 
overhaul of the electoral system in a more decidedly majority-based 
direction; overhaul of form of government (adoption of a presidential 
system is one of the fundamental options); modification of norms 
governing judiciary power and the functioning of justice. 
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The same considerations with regard to privatisation and institutional 
decentralisation are applied to initiatives such as: deregulation, re-
definition of the role of citizens’ rights and accountancy reform at the 
State level. In all these cases: a) the reform process has only recently 
been begun; b) the impact is therefore still limited; c) there is strong 
pressure for further development. 
Fifthly, a few initiatives are distinguished by more significant advances. 
These include: formal privatisation, re-definition of the administrative 
machine and internal decentralisation. In fact, almost all public 
economic bodies have been transformed into limited companies. The 
intervention in the administrative machine is distinguished by the 
wholesale adoption of the principle of budget delegation: from the 
political organisational level to the managerial level (and further down 
the scale the organisational level as far as local public bodies). This is 
drastic move away from traditional managerial regulations, firmly 
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anchored to centralisation and politicising of decision-making 
procedures. Moreover, the internal decentralisation issue is distinguished 
by the wholesale adoption of operational mechanisms for planning and 
checking; these aim to ensure that managerial operations connected with 
acquisition and employment of resources are carried out in the light of 
the principle of discernment-integration between politics and 
administration, and of the principle of economic rationality (pursuit of 
efficiency and effectiveness).  
A relevant consequence of the widespread adoption of discernment-
integration between political function (planning and checks) and 
administrative function (operational management) is that budget 
decision-making by political organs will now be in the hands of 
management. 
In the light of the above considerations it is possible to affirm that New 
Public Management principles have strongly affected the reform process 
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in Italy leading the Italian public sector towards the modernization of its 
previous structure. 
This is certainly a profound change, probably destined not to find its 
equal in other countries in the NPM movement. 
 
4. Administrative evolution in European countries.  
The United Kingdom is seen as the progenitor of New Public 
Management in Europe. During the eighties Margaret Thatcher shifted 
power from the intermediate centres of power, which had been created 
by the political powers and the administrative body as a whole (unions, 
local bodies, professional groups), moving the responsibility for state-
reform towards the centre . The white-collar unions were sized down 
considerably and top managers with permanent contracts were placed in 
charge of administrative agencies (Rhodes 1997). The previously-
nationalised industries and public services were nearly all privatised. 
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Even more emphasis was placed on the characteristics of pragmatism and 
managerial ability, which were however already present in Britain’s 
administrative organisation. With the change of government from 
Conservative to New Labour in 1997, the role of market rules  in the 
public services went from offering discipline and guaranteeing the 
monetisation of the effects of competition, to being the source of 
innovation and renewal in the public services. Public contracts and 
public procedures of supplying money were inspired more by 
collaborative methods than strictly competitive ones. In many respects 
Scandinavian countries can be treated as a whole, with the Netherlands 
often being grouped together with them (Torres 2004 e Preforms 1998). 
Scandinavia and the Netherlands are linked by the fact that their 
administrations place great care on the needs of their citizens and there is 
a continuing tradition of consultation and negotiation between public 
and private authorities (Torres 2004, 101). The direction of 
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administrative reform in these Nordic countries is one of radical political 
decentralisation and administration, in the context of a public sector that 
remains pervasive and a state that is committed to providing welfare 
(which has only been sized down to a slight extent). However, 
Scandinavian public administration remains strongly legalistic (Jorgensen 
1996). Sweden has several public agencies, whose independence is 
guaranteed by the Constitution. The ministries do not have direct 
responsibility in the agencies’ decisions and therefore they cannot oppose 
their decisions. Checks are carried out by administrative jurisdiction and 
the ombudsman. In Denmark and Norway, on the contrary, public 
agencies are subject to direct ministerial control. Norway and Sweden 
differ from Denmark in that they have politically nominated secretaries 
of state and elections every four years. In Denmark, the prime minister 
can decide when to call general political elections. These differences 
bring about different relationships between politicians and civil servants. 
44 
 
In Norway and Denmark, during the 1980s, a system of management was 
introduced based on the definition of goals and verification of results 
(Christensen e Laegreid 1998). All the Nordic countries adopted excellent 
initiatives for verifying administrative performance. Among 
Scandinavian countries Denmark is often seen to be in the vanguard of 
decentralisation (Preforms 1998). Compared with Sweden, Denmark has 
a more pragmatic and liberal style, whereas Sweden has a long tradition 
of official policy analysis and diagnosis of administrative problems, with 
strong ties between academia and actual practice. In the Netherlands, 
institutional tradition has always aimed to involve civil society in the 
supply of services and local-level decision-making (Kickert 1995). 
Norway and Finland lag behind Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, 
but the reform dynamics are similar.  
In the German-speaking world(Austria, Germany and Switzerland), the 
administrative model is still the classic Weberian one (Torres 2004). The 
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public sector has a distinct profile that clearly places it outside the social 
and economic sphere. Administrative practice is linked to the Rechtsstaat 
doctrine and is strongly legalistic. Relationships between offices function 
through detailed directives, organised in line with a strict hierarchy. The 
public employer-employee relationship is characterised by permanent 
contracts, job security and non-transferability of post of work. The 
parties recruit their managerial class from the actual ranks of public 
administration(Torres 2004, 101).  
New Public Management philosophy, based on contractualisation and 
managerialisation runs into institutional, cognitive and normative 
obstacles in the German administrative tradition. 
An overall reform-bill is further complicated by the federal structure of 
these countries, where each region holds the reins of its own 
administrative policies and there is a strong tradition of local autonomy 
(Wollmann 2001, 167). In Germany and Austria there has not yet been 
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an extensive application of the instruments for checking accrual-
accounting balances and performance indicators. The introduction of 
contractual instruments of common law as a normal method for 
managing public activity is still in the embryonic state.  
In Switzerland the status of civil servant is open and the interchange 
with the private sector is quite good (Schedler 1997). However the salary 
levels and the rigid salary scheme make it difficult to attract certain 
specific types of worker (e.g. programmers and financial managers). At 
intermediate or regional levels of public administration, the influence of 
consultants from the private sector has been decisive in the introduction 
of typical New Public Management solutions. 
The countries of southern Europe are influenced by the French 
administrative model, founded on the centrality of administrative law 
and the supply of services at the same level throughout the country, 
through the workings of the central apparatus of the state. The 
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management of public finances is still mainly centralised, in spite of a 
recent tendency towards federalism or fiscal regionalism (Torres 2004, 
104). 
In France the public sector has been affected by competition. Market 
principles and the individual assessment of performance are difficult to 
impose in a context of heavily unionised public employment 
(Guyomarch 1999, 177 e 185). Spain represents a particularly interesting 
example for other reasons. Until 1975 the country was governed by an 
authoritarian regime, which, on the contrary to the rest of Europe, 
greatly limited the spread of the welfare state and administrative 
structures. With the fall of Francoism the democratic regime tried to 
close the gap, and between 1975 and 1995, public sector expenditure 
went from 24.4% to 45.5% of GNP. Therefore Spain found itself 
combating a rapidly expanding public sector, whilst throughout Europe 
New Public Management called for a containing or reduction of public 
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spending. In more recent times, the Spanish government has introduced 
many of the New Public Management instruments, but with no great 
results (Torres e Pina 2004, 446). Wide-scale administrative 
decentralisation and greatly reinforced unions have, without doubt, 
made the road to change more complicated. Adopting occasional  
measures, without the introduction of a complete reform packet, has 
been another cause of the reformers’ significant failure. In Spain too, 
privatisation has not been accompanied by incentives to be competitive. 
Managerialisation has advanced slowly, and responsibility for actual 
management has not been clearly defined. The public finance system is 
still centred exclusively on correctness and formal ties in management, 
rather than on checking the results. Administrative management is 
strictly separated and it is difficult to establish retribution systems based 
on individual performance, just as it is difficult to attribute responsibility 
49 
 
functions to external personnel recruited ad hoc (Torres e Pina 2004, 
453-456). 
To conclude this brief summary it should be noted that the rush for 
reform that has involved the public administration set-up throughout 
Europe is multiform. So far the road to reform has been laid down by the 
intervention philosophies of New Public Management. The reforms 
carried out in Nordic countries and Holland might represent an 
alternative to the model for modernising the public sector based 
exclusively on the actual character of the market, accessible above all to 
German-influenced countries and the Mediterranean area, where a 
certain bureaucratic spirit has been maintained in the recruitment and 
training of civil servants. In these countries the functionaries are, and 
will remain, professionals in law and are by nature reluctant to take 
decisions. In Nordic Europe and the Netherlands the predominance of 
jurists was greatly reduced in the second half of the 20th century. 
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Southern European countries introduced various measures aimed at 
raising the quality of public services. For this reason they have based 
themselves on directives of the European Foundation for Quality 
Management (Efqm), which lays down goals regarding leadership, 
attention towards employees and citizens, collaboration with other 
bodies and institutions, development of performance indicators and 
checking of results. 
As regards the other elements in New Public Management, more closely 
linked to competition (such as the providing of public services based on 
competitive bargaining and emphasis  on the private managerialistic 
style), the three great continental-European models (Nordic-
Scandinavian, Germanic, southern European) need to question the role of 
the public sector in society, and therefore strong resistance or refusal will 
presumably be encountered. Only Sweden, and to a certain extent 
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Finland and Holland, seem to have embarked on concrete initiatives in 
this sense. 
5 .Directions of convergence  
In spite of the different ways in which NPM principles have been 
received in various European countries it should be noted that, from 
analysis of the administrative reforms carried out over the last few years 
it is possible to single out convergence in the various European public 
administrations towards certain common principles inspired by NPM 
ideas. By convergence we mean specifically the introduction of 
guidelines laid down by NPM into the public administration of various 
nations with the aim to complete the modernization process and to 
improve performance of public sector. 
International convergence of public administrations is also favoured by 
the increasing importance of the international arena, and therefore by 
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the diminished capacity of governments to isolate themselves 
economically and politically from global pressures. These pressures 
manifest themselves through international markets and organisations 
such as the European Union. Convergence and internationalisation of 
national public sectors is developed in the following principal directions 
inspired by the actual principles of NPM (Peters e Pierre 1998). 
Α) Thinking up new instruments for checking and allocating 
responsibility: changes the role of elected representatives, something 
which is usually downsized. Political leadership is less strongly-linked to 
an elective public office and begins to be more dependent on political 
entrepreneurship. Political leaders take on key responsibility in 
developing networks and “consortiums” of public and private resources. 
The only role of a traditional type left to politics is that of establishing 
goals and priorities. 
Β) Streamlining of the separation between public and private. 
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It is necessary to close the gap that has been created between the state 
and the rest of society. Anybody operating on the market, under strong 
pressure, has developed sophisticated models of management and 
allocation of resources. Public bureaucracies have long remained cut off 
from any type of pressure. This has resulted in disorganisation and 
neglect, inefficiency, obsession with procedure, indifference towards the 
needs of the consumer. New Public Management theories maintain that 
efficient management techniques are the same in every sector, and 
should not therefore be differentiated in accordance with the public or 
private nature of the organisation (Peters 1996). 
C) Greater emphasis on competition.  
The idea of exploiting competition to create greater efficiency and more 
attention to the client in the public sector is a clear demonstration of the 
penetration of the principles of company-oriented derivation. The 
introduction of competition has had important consequences: it requires 
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a loosening of political control over functioning of services and the 
attribution of wide-ranging decisional discretion at all levels of the 
organization. Thanks to the creation of an internal market for all 
services, the competition consents each organizational unit to evaluate its 
costs in a much more accurate way. 
D) Greater emphasis on checking results. 
The checking of results was introduced through the use of indicators 
such as customer-satisfaction, or introducing private actors or volunteers 
in the production and supply of public services, in order to boost 
adherence to the rules of good administration and adaptation to citizens’ 
demands. 
E) Creation of new management tools and techniques.  
According to the theories of New Public Management managing by 
pointing in a certain direction is the key task for the public sector 
(Rhodes 1997, 49). This entails establishing priorities and setting goals. 
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The lowest common denominator of these intervention policies is a state 
that, if not yet minimal, is certainly more streamlined, less costly and 
potentially more efficient than the Weberian state. The intervention 
policies can be translated into specific reform measures in three 
categories: 1) “market-based”, 2) “participative”, 3) “deregulation-based”. 
 Market reforms include (Merusi 2002) : introduction of the agency 
model, which attempts to keep administration away from political 
decisions; payments linked to merit for public employees; the creation of 
an internal quasi-market, separating suppliers from purchasers in the 
public sector; bargaining based on achieving goals, especially in 
recruiting other managers; adoption of accrual accounting instead of 
cash-based accounting, emphasising the importance of disposable capital 
and costs of future outlay; revision of every administrative programme 
on the basis of cost-benefit analysis; creation of “single desks” in all cases 
where it is possible to eliminate duplication of competences. 
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Deregulation is based on the assumption that many of the rules laid 
down within public bodies for managing personnel and the budget are 
useless and should be eliminated. There are various similarities with 
market reform, but the central element in this case is different. 
Deregulation can predict: a change in the rules of financial management, 
so as to consent agencies to decide in greater autonomy; the attribution 
of greater autonomy to single administrative units with regard to supply 
agreements and contracts; the elimination of rigid controls over 
employment, promotion and dismissal of public employees (Peters 1997). 
Reforms of a participative nature aim to improve the quality of services 
by involving workers from the sector and consumers (often called 
“clients”) in decision-making.  
Participation reforms include: citizens’ procedural rights in dealings with 
institutions; quality management; decentralisation, which devolves 
responsibility for projects to outside bodies; citizens’ charters or service 
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charters, which stipulate the  minimum quality levels to be expected 
from the services provided. We shall now analyse several of these 
reforms of a participative nature in more detail, and with the aid of 
examples. 
 
5.1 The ombudsman and the defence of good administration  
Among the tools for fostering quality in administrative activity, the 
ombudsman stands out in the latter part of the last century as the 
institution with the greatest capacity for international diffusion (Mortati 
1974).  Today there is an ombudsman or an analogous authority at the 
national level in more than 100 countries throughout the world, without 
counting the ombudsman instituted at the local level. The institution of 
the ombudsman, better known in Italy under the title “difensore civico” 
(lit. civic defender), originated in Sweden in 1809, and after more than a 
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year’s incubating period started to spread throughout Scandinavia and 
subsequently the rest of the world. The basic characteristics of the 
ombudsman are today those of a “complaints office” for the citizen 
dissatisfied with his treatment by the public administration. Through 
informal powers and the moral persuasion that it possesses 
(recommendations to public administration, official relations with 
Parliament, faculty of proposing reforms) the ombudsman can often 
resolve controversies through negotiation between administration and 
private parties (Cominelli 2005), and can put  itself forward as an 
institution to reform other institutions. The limited costs and reduced 
operational times have turned the ombudsman into a practical alternative 
to administrative jurisdiction (Leino 2004, 364) . 
Although the ombudsman exists at Regional and local levels, only Italy 
and Germany of the 25 members of the European Union do not have an 
ombudsman at the national level. In 1995 the European Union 
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nominated the first EU ombudsman (named “Mediatore europeo”, i.e. 
European mediator, in the Italian versions of the treaties), which could 
officially deal with complaints made by EU citizens about EU 
institutions. In the first ten years of activity the EU ombudsman has seen 
the number of complaints quadruple and has had many decisions 
overturned, as well as administrative practices that do not fully respond 
to the canons of good administration. The institution of the ombudsman 
has had considerable success in State organisations and its reach is today 
also spreading to International organisations. It is a flexible tool and a 
permanent source of administrative reform proposals. The EU 
ombudsman has managed to put so much pressure on the Charter of Nice 
and the Constitution that the right to good administration has been 
incorporated, and various institutions have been compelled to take into 
consideration the possibility of a binding “good administration code” for 
their employees. The best road for the ombudsman to take consists in 
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keeping an eye over quality in administration, not from a legalistic point 
of view, but fostering a culture of service in the administrational sector 
(Tomkins 2000). While this might not present a problem for the Nordic 
administrative culture, difficulties arise with the German, French and 
southern European administrative models. The ombudsman adapts to 
whichever institutional and cultural context it might find itself in, and 
modulates its operations by following the Pole star of change and good 
administration. Specifications as to what constitutes “good 
administration” crop up ever more frequently in national regulations and 
paradoxically stem from a compilation of cases of poor administration.  
 
5.2  Service charters for the citizen 
Citizen’s Charters are an experiment arising out of a UK government 
initiative launched in 1991 with the aim of implementing a ten-year 
programme to improve public services. The Citizen’s Charter proposed to 
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set standards of quality in the providing of services, to assess the validity 
of performance and in the final analysis, to encourage improvements in 
quality through pressure applied by public opinion. The standards laid 
down in the Charter were of either a quantitative type (e.g. maximum 
waiting time) or qualitative type (e.g. respect for an individual’s privacy 
and dignity), and in cases of infringement compensation was envisaged. 
In subsequent years other countries followed the example of the Citizen’s 
Charter: among these there were France, Belgium, Portugal, Italy and 
Spain(Torres e Pina 2004) . The Italian initiative was launched in 1993 
and the major difference from the UK model was that there was still no 
provision for a standard (as regards services) applicable at the national 
level, the faculty to fix its own minimum standards being left in the 
hands of the individual bodies.  
Apart from this, very few Italians knew about the Service Charters, at 
least initially, because they were poorly advertised, and so adoption of 
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the Charters was delayed by many months or even years. A survey 
carried out in 1998 by the Electricity and Gas Authority revealed that 
knowledge of the Charters on the part of the citizen varied from sector to 
sector, and even in the most virtuous sectors the figure never rose above 
10%. In electrical services the quality standards had been set directly by 
the operators, with very ambitious goals. Compensation in the event of 
disservice was only awarded on request, and seeing the lack of 
information regarding standards, in the vast majority of cases 
compensation was never even claimed. 
Little attention has been devoted to the launching phases and evaluation 
of the results of the Service Charters. In the United Kingdom, 
implementation of the project was entrusted to a permanently 
operational task force endowed with excellent resources. The committee 
responsible for supervising the Service Charters in Italy did not have a 
permanent staff and was made up of three part-time experts. However, 
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the most significant element of differentiation when compared to other 
experiences was that in applying the standards of quality practically in 
Italy these were confused with a formalised right to a certain level of 
performance. On the other hand it was observed that the best way of 
rendering the Charters more effective was, rather than create binding 
obligations for the service-supplying body, to create moral obligations of 
responsibility and accessibility in dealings with citizens. One of the 
advantages of the Service Charters in the United Kingdom was to succeed 
in improving quality without it being necessary to initiate great 
legislative reforms. The legislative provisions that set down new laws risk 
constituting an obstacle to development of the most flexible and 
responsive public services. In the United Kingdom, the results of the 
assessment did not only serve to impose sanctions, but also, and 
principally, to create higher expectations. 
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The differences in the link between “rights” and “action” are often 
related to the cultural context. 
In the common law profile, the service Charter represents a verifiable 
tool inspired by New Public Management. Goals to be reached, rather 
than juridical aspects, are indicated; these objectives are laid down from 
above in order to maximise public attention of consumers and managers. 
In the public law profile, the service Charter tends to confuse standards 
of quality with rights, and ends up creating additional guarantees, which 
often actually turn out to be rather ineffective in the administrative 
system (Lo Schiavo 2002, 695). 
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Conclusions   
In the light of all the above we might conclude that the principles of 
NPM have had a great influence on the processes of reform and 
modernisation in the Italian public administration. In particular, from a 
comparative analysis with other European countries it emerges  that Italy 
is one of the countries that has been most stimulated by the NPM 
guidelines. However, it should be stressed that the NPM principles have 
influenced reform movements in most of the world. 
In fact, initiatives of a NPM type are widespread throughout the OCSE 
countries and have reached most of the Commonwealth countries, 
without excluding, however, the ex-Communist block countries. This 
does not mean that a complete uniformity of application has been found. 
In fact, to this end it is possible to highlight differences between one 
country and another, since the profiles for modernisation range from 
complete openness to market-forces and privatisation (United Kingdom) 
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to a radical redefinition of the public sector in line with the model for 
the private sector (New Zealand); from cases of rapid advance towards 
managerial running, to cases of co-existence of deep-rooted links with 
more traditional forms of bureaucratic government in accordance with 
pre-set rules (Japan, Germany, Austria). A greater impact of NPM-type 
ideas was also discerned in Anglo-Saxon contexts (also with internal 
differences) when compared with eastern regions of continental Europe. 
This can be reasonably put down to a long tradition based on the 
predominance in most European countries of a juridical-type school of 
thought in public administration. In particular, every administrative 
tradition has reacted differently in accepting or refusing the various types 
of reform. Changes in the public sector certainly depend on differing 
cultural variables that impinge on the circulation of ideas and policies. 
Anglo-American culture has shown itself to be particularly inclined 
towards market reform, whereas German culture has opposed it forcibly. 
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On the other hand Scandinavian administrative tradition has proved to 
be receptive towards injections of managerial quality. Deregulation 
reform has been carried out more frequently in Australia and the USA 
than in Europe. The most common reforms have been those of a 
participative nature, followed by internal deregulation in public bodies. 
Nevertheless in the light of what has been documented here it is also 
possible to identify (in spite of national differences) an administrative 
convergence of reform movements carried out in the various European 
states on the road to adopting several common principles, clearly inspired 
by the NPM, which have facilitated the birth and implementation of the  
process of modernisation of European public administrations. 
As above shown, one of the main elements of modernization introduced 
in the Italian public administration is represented by the change of 
decisional processes and organizational models, through the recognition 
of the principle of distinguishing between politics and administration. 
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The new relationship between politics and administration necessitated 
providing politicians with orientation skills and public executives with 
managerial skills in order to avoid political interference and to fully 
achieve managerial accountability  in the sphere of management.  
On this regard this work in the following chapters will analyze the 
relationship between politicians and public managers in the Italian 
public administration in order to verify  if the discipline introduced by 
the reform has been really able to realize the principle of distinguishing 
between politics and administration. 
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CHAPTER. II 
 
ON THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
THE POLITICAL AND MANAGERIAL LEVELS 
IN THE ITALIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM 
 
Abstract 
This chapter deals with the Italian public administration reform, carried 
out on the basis of  the "new public management" principles. This 
innovation is geared towards the introduction into the public sector of 
private management instruments, with a view to improving efficiency, 
effectiveness and financial stability.  
In particular, the chapter will focus on relations between political 
authorities and public managers. As regards this, the measures 
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introduced by the reform are mainly designed to ensure that managers 
have greater autonomy in dealing with political bodies.  
However, there has been growing criticism over the last few decades of 
the results of the system introduced by this reform. In fact, it has been 
observed how the new regulation provides juridical  instruments which 
might influence the manager’s activities and his or her managerial 
autonomy. 
This chapter aims to explore whether such instruments can really affect 
managers, by preventing them from exercising their functions 
autonomously; it also aims to verify whether the normative system 
introduced by the reform has really brought about a clear distinction 
between managerial and political functions or whether, on the contrary, 
it has only brought about a formal separation, which does not fulfill the 
goals of the Italian public administration reform. 
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               Introduction 
Over the last few decades, the Italian public administration has 
undergone significant reform, which has profoundly modified the 
previous structure.  
The aim of this reform was to rectify the structural defects in the system, 
which have led to inefficiency in public management and an improper 
allocation and utilization of resources. 
 A further aim of the reform was to introduce private principles and 
instruments (such as managerial ability, accountability and control) in 
the public field in order to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and 
financial stability of state enterprise. 
In particular, the reform introduces measures that are designed to 
provide greater autonomy to the executive body rather than the political 
authorities (Cassese, 2003). At the same time, it recognizes to politicians 
the power to carry out timely and regular evaluations regarding the 
72 
 
efficiency, efficacy and financial stability of management action. Lastly, 
it would like managers to be involved  in proposing  strategic objectives.  
The reform, therefore, has the aim of creating a system  which combines 
the principles of function separation and strategic interaction. 
This chapter will focus, in particular, on the relationship between 
politicians and public managers and is underpinned by analysis of the 
regulation (introduced by the reform) to observe whether its objectives 
have been achieved.  
One of the main goals of the reform was to give public managers the 
same powers as private company managers. Consequently, it was 
necessary to ensure that the management group had greater managerial 
autonomy from the political bodies, bearing in mind that before the 
reform politicians had the power to influence managerial action 
considerably. This often occurred because power was officially 
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sanctioned to the political authorities so that they had the authority to 
substitute managers during the execution of their managerial functions . 
With regard to this, the new regulation introduced by the Legislative 
Decree N°165/01 (articles nos. 4, 14, 16, 17) has eliminated this power 
and seems to recognize greater managerial autonomy. 
However, the Legislative Decree N°165/01 also presents regulations that 
are unclearly-worded and , if applied to Public administrations, might 
result in a consequent reduction in managerial autonomy( D’Alessio , 
2005, a). 
The regulation introduced by the reform betrays several “dark sides”; it 
could allow politicians to gain influencing powers over a manager’s 
activities, something which the reform was actually meant to eliminate.  
This situation is caused by the presence of norms that provide 
instruments (e.g. regulation of managerial positions [art. 19]; the spoils 
system[ art. 19 par. 8]; top management positions[ art. 19 par. 3 ] and the 
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use of external managers [art.19 par. 6]), which could influence the 
activities of managers and their managerial autonomy. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the juridical-normative issues 
concerning the relationship between politicians and public managers. It 
also intends to verify whether such  juridical and organizational 
instruments can really affect managers in the execution of their duties. 
Lastly, this work aims to formulate hypotheses regarding legislative 
innovation to resolve the above-mentioned issues. 
 
Scope, approach and limitations of work 
The chapter keeps to a legal studies approach and is based on a juridical 
analysis of the new regulation. This analysis aims to verify whether the 
new regulation is really able to modify the previous system in accordance 
with the reform goals. It also analyzes the literature concerning the 
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effects of Italian Public administration reform and the application of 
New Public Management principles in Italy and other countries.  
The work stems from an initial field survey carried out by the author in 
the Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructures, through an interview 
with the Head of the Evaluation and Control Department; the objective 
was to understand managers’ perceptions regarding the new regulation 
and, specifically, the extent to which greater autonomy to managers from 
politicians is actually granted. 
The employment of a juridical approach is considered by the author as 
relevant to the research goals, since it allows one to verify to what extent 
a change in the normative framework is able, by itself, to guarantee the 
separation of functions between politicians and managers and the 
recognition of greater managerial autonomy to public 
executives(Borgonovi , 2005).  
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It is on this subject that we start our analysis, on the assumption that the 
normative level is only a first step in the innovation process. In fact, this 
process  must also embrace proper changes in the management system 
(e.g. planning & control tools and approaches, evaluation and career 
mechanisms, information systems, organization structures and 
mechanisms, management development systems, cultural development) 
and in the wider social system (e.g. implying a change in the system of 
values and perceptions of citizens and the wider community, and in the 
processes through which it communicates with the public sector, and 
evaluates its performance). 
More specifically, the thesis of this chapter is that the reform has not 
accomplished its goals, principally because it was not well designed  by 
the legislator. 
The limitations of this work are only related to the juridical approach 
adopted, with the initial limitation in the chapter, in particular, 
77 
 
depending on the elaboration of the analysis under juridical profiles 
alone. In fact, as previously stated, we understand that, in order to carry 
out a thorough field analysis, it is necessary to consider other relevant 
areas and topics, such as, for example, planning & control systems, career 
and retribution systems and other organizational mechanisms. These 
important variables will be analyzed in a subsequent stage of our 
research. 
Another limitation of  this work is represented by the completion of only 
one interview in the field analysis. A single interview does not actually 
enable one to gather the information and empirical data needed to 
sustain a general field analysis. Nevertheless, this interview is still useful 
for the validation of our thesis.        
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1. Reform of public management regulation 
Public management was regulated in Italy since 1972, by presidential 
decree n. 748. This measure aimed to recognize precise competences in 
managers, but it did not deal with the hierarchical relationship which 
linked public executives and politicians. The political authorities were 
able to influence management activities through their power to lay down 
precise instructions for managers, their power of revocation and 
modification of a manager’s actions and  their power to  substitute the 
manager in the execution of his or her duties.  
This situation led to inefficiency in public management and an improper 
allocation and use of resources. For this reason, the Italian legislator, 
following the New Public Management guidelines, introduced private 
management tools into the public sector with a view to improving  its 
efficiency, effectiveness and financial stability. 
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With regard to the relationship between politicians and public managers, 
the reform aimed to give public managers the same powers as private 
company managers. Consequently, it was necessary to ensure 
management had greater autonomy from political bodies, bearing in 
mind that the previous regulation recognized in politicians the power to 
influence managerial action considerably. 
The innovation was first implemented through legislative decree n. 29 
/93, which stipulated a clear distribution of skills between politicians 
(orientation competences) and executives (management competences) 
and modified the hierarchical relationship between them through the 
elimination of the above-mentioned powers , which allowed politicians 
to influence managerial activity. The objectives of the reform were 
finally implemented by the legislative decree 80/98, which extended the 
innovations to all managerial positions, and by the legislative decree 
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165/01, which coordinated and regulated all provisions concerning 
public employees. 
The new regulation introduced the principle of functional separation to 
regulate the relationship between politicians and public managers. 
 
2. The functional separation between political and administrative levels  
The relationship between political and managerial levels is very complex 
bearing in mind that in the Italian system there are several constitutional 
principles which regulate this field( Alesse,2006).  
In particular, article 97 of the Italian Constitution defines the public 
administration as a bureaucratic apparatus separated from political power 
and characterized by its impartiality and efficiency, whilst art. 98 states 
that public executives must operate exclusively in the national interest. 
On the other hand, article 95, assigns to each Minister responsibility for 
the activity of his/her Ministry and enunciates the principle of the public 
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administration’s instrumentality in the implementation of general 
government policy . 
The constitutional norms require administrative activity to be connected 
to the orientation and powers of control of the representative institutions 
(principle of democracy). At the same time they require a guarantee of 
impartiality on the part of public administration action, so as to avoid 
favoritism and discrimination in connection with the individual’s 
political affiliations ( Merloni, 2006, p. 138). 
 The reform of the Italian public administration aimed to reconcile these 
requirements through the application of the principle of functional 
separation between politics and administration( Forte, 2005) ,which was 
introduced into the organization of the Italian State through the 
legislative decree 29/93.  
The above-mentioned principle provides for a distribution of the 
functions  within the public sector between orientation competences 
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assigned to the political authorities and management competences 
assigned to the  professional executives ( D’Alessio, 2005, b).  
This principle was formally adopted in Italian legislative reform. In 
particular, art. 4 of the legislative decree. n. 165/01,  expressly entrusts 
public managers with all managerial competences (and direct 
responsibility for the results of their activity) whilst art. 14 prohibits 
politicians from interfering in a manager’s activities( Colombo, 2004). 
 However, the regulation also contains rather vague aspects, which might 
contribute to preventing the actual application of the above-described 
principle. 
Our analysis will concentrate on a complex series of instruments that 
could provide political authorities with the power to influence an 
executive’s actions.  
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3. Instruments influencing the executive’s actions: regulation of the 
managerial role [ art. 19 leg.decree.165/01] 
Regulation of the managerial role is closely connected to the principle of 
functional separation, because it allows us to evaluate whether this 
principle has actually been  introduced by the normative. 
The regulation provides that the managerial position be assigned through 
a unilateral measure, followed by a contract defining  the economic 
conditions.  
More specifically, the law provides for three kinds of managerial 
position: the top management position, the general managerial position 
and the ordinary managerial position (D’Alessio & Valensise, 2004). The 
first two positions are conferred by political authority (which also has 
the power of revocation) and principally to managers belonging to the 
first managerial level, whereas the last is conferred on second-level 
managers by the higher-level managers. Therefore, in each 
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administration there is a list of executives with managers being assigned 
to one of the two levels. 
The normative states that all the positions are conferred for a limited 
period (from three years to five years) . 
The above description shows how regulation of the managerial role 
contains elements which might prevent both the actual attainment of 
managerial autonomy and the principle of functional separation. 
 
3.1.  Power of nomination and role duration 
The first influencing element is represented by the power of nomination 
of top managers and general managers, a power which the law ( art. 19 
par. 3,4,) grants to political authorities.  
These powers can directly affect the managers in their activities, 
considering that the politicians can, at their discretion, assign and 
confirm managerial posts. In this hypothesis managers could be 
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influenced in their managerial choices by politicians who have the power 
to confer the role on them. 
The regulation provides a further influencing aspect, which is 
represented by the term of duration of the appointment ( art. 19 par. 2). 
The limited duration of the position might prevent managers from 
remaining impartial from  political bodies (D’Orta, 2002). 
In fact, managers with a short-term appointment might be subject to 
severe pressure from politicians having the power to re-confirm their 
appointment (D’Alessio, 2009). This influencing power is greater when 
the duration of the managerial position is shorter than the political  term 
(usually five years), because in this case the power of  renewal of the  
position will depend on the very same subject exercising the power of 
nomination (D’Alessio, 2006). 
In this case, in the execution of his management duties, the manager that 
is interested in being re-confirmed might be more open to suggestion on 
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the part of the political authorities. This situation may affect the 
impartiality of the manager and consequent administrative action. 
The above description demonstrates that the limited duration of the 
position and allocation of power of renewal to politicians might 
represent instruments that put pressure on the manager’s activity. 
 
3.2.  Career progression of professional executives  [ art. 23 
leg.decree.165/01] 
The separation of competences between political bodies and managers 
requires guarantees of personal independence on the part of executives 
(Ponti,2006). This could be accomplished by preventing any interference 
on the part of politicians in procedures regarding the career  progression 
of managers. 
When management is organized on two levels (as in the case of the 
Ministries) it may exercises a political influence, because the choices 
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made by the political bodies might affect an executive’s career 
development (Talamo, 2004).  
In fact, the normative (art. 23, par. 1, leg.decree. 165/01) states that only 
managers who have held  a general managerial position or equivalent 
duties for at least three years, may be incorporated on the higher 
managerial level. 
 A position conferred by politicians (who have the power to confer top 
manager and general manager positions) might have direct consequences 
on  the manager’s career progression ( Merloni,2006).  
Therefore executives on the lowest level will have a particular interest in 
achieving the high-level position and holding it for at least three years. 
This situation might influence managerial choices. 
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4. Instruments influencing an executive’s actions: Spoils system and top 
management position 
The normative introduced by the reform presents two further juridical 
instruments which could greatly affect  managerial autonomy.  
The first of these is the spoils system mechanism, which might influence 
a top manager’s activities, while the second concerns the influencing 
power that top managers can exercise over  professional executives. 
 
4.1.Influence on activities of top management through the spoils system [ 
art. 19 par 8 leg.decree. 165/01] 
Analyzing the regulation of the spoils system is essential for defining the 
relationship between politics and administration (as introduced by the 
reform). 
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The spoils system is a mechanism that allows politicians who have won 
elections to choose which persons to assign to top managerial posts (e.g. 
General Secretary or Head of Ministry Department) (Gardini,2002). 
This system usually provides for a position having an equal duration to 
that of the political post.  
More specifically, the normative ( art. 19 par. 8 leg.decree. 165/01) states 
that  the top management appointments (general secretary and head of 
department) will terminate 90 days after the new government has taken 
office, without any need for justification because of the new government.  
The spoils system has been affected by several rulings by the Italian 
Constitutional Court, which has defined the legitimate constitutional  
parameters of this mechanism(Talamo,2003). 
The Court affirms that the spoils system is legal if it only concerns the 
top managerial posts. In order to identify these positions, the Court first 
introduced the criterion regarding the nature of conferring bodies (the 
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top management position is considered as such when the position is 
conferred by political authorities)(Gardini,2006) and, subsequently, it 
proposed a further criterion, which individuate a top management 
position only in the cases of a direct and immediate relationship between 
managers and political bodies (Corso & Fares , 2007). 
In accordance with the above-mentioned rulings, the spoils system must 
operate only with regard to managers who have a close relationship with 
politicians.  
The decisions are based on the consideration that a fiduciary relationship 
with the top management could help the government in the achievement 
of its objectives( Battini,2006, p. 911). 
Although the Constitutional Court recognized the spoils system’s 
legitimacy, there are many doubts about its compatibility with 
Constitutional principles ; in particular with Art. 97, which demands 
impartiality of public action and the guarantee of regularity and 
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continuity of administrative action, even in the event of a change of 
government.   
In fact, when managers are linked to politicians in this way, it is very 
unlikely that administrative action will respect the principle of 
impartiality (art. 97) which requires, on the contrary, the objectivity of 
managers  with regard to interests  they have to oversee( Satta,1989). 
 
4.2.Influence on the  professional executive’s activities  through  the top 
management positions. 
 The top management positions are represented by executives at the 
highest level of the administration. They support political bodies in the 
functioning of their duties and they also guarantee the continuity of the 
administration’s activities in the event of reversal of the political 
scenario.  
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These figures were introduced in the ministerial structure through the 
creation of a General Secretary or Head of department. 
In the new model introduced by the reform, which is characterized by a 
complex system of relationships between political and administrative 
levels, this figure could be brought into question by the need to 
distinguish clearly between the two orders of competence 
(Merloni,2006).  
On the one hand, the Italian system provides for political  bodies which  
have the support of the cabinet offices, and on the other, executives who 
have their specific managerial competences, but at the same time have to 
apply the directives indicated by the political authorities. 
There does not seem to be space for a figure on the border-line between 
the two competence levels, due to the uncertainty as to whether to assign 
this figure to the politicians’ level or the management level. 
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In the new scenario introduced by the reform the employment of this 
figure is becoming more frequent, with emphasis being laid on the 
fiduciary features ( Cassese, 2005)  . 
There are two possible explanations for the success of these figures; the 
first considers the top management position as a useful instrument for 
providing the administration with cohesion and enhancing its ability to 
respond to political orientation .  
A second possible interpretation is that the success of this figure depends 
on its ambiguity and on the possibility that it could be used, in the 
politics-administration relationship, to allow politicians to regain those 
powers of intervention in the management area that the reform aimed to 
abolish( Merloni,2007). 
This can occur through providing top managers with excessive powers 
(e.g. powers of nomination and evaluation) over lower-level executives, 
or allocating not only simple coordination powers, but also hierarchical 
94 
 
powers (such as the power to order or the power to give precise 
directives to professional executives). 
With regard to this, art.19 par. 5 and art. 16  par. e, seem to recognize the 
above-mentioned powers for  high level managers. 
The recognition of these powers for top managers could strongly 
influence an executive’s action, not only being influenced by upper-level 
managers, but also, indirectly, by politicians, bearing in mind that the 
relationship between political bodies and top management positions is a 
fiduciary relationship; for this reason top management is particularly 
keen that lower management should follow politicians’ 
recommendations in management activity. 
 Lastly, one might affirm that in the absence of dispositions expressly 
preventing these figures from developing and becoming the politician’s 
instruments of intervention, without clearly defining their managerial 
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duties, there is a real risk that the principle of the functional separation 
might be wrongly applied.  
 
5. Instruments influencing an executive’s actions:  the improper use of 
external management[ art. 19 par 6  leg.decree 165/01] 
The possibility of also assigning a managerial position to subjects who do 
not belong to the professional executive staff ("external management") is 
not provided for by the law as a type of fiduciary position, but as an 
opportunity to employ professional skills not readily available within the 
administration(Merloni, 2007). 
 The vague formulation of art. 19, par. 6, has allowed politicians to 
widely use this opportunity to boost the number of fiduciary positions.  
External management represents an instrument for introducing the spoils 
system in the  public sector, and it has permitted executives to join the 
96 
 
upper managerial level as a result of their personal affiliation to political 
bodies. 
This seems to be the interpretation provided by decree no.262/2006, 
which modified art. 19, par 8, leg.decree 165/01 ( the disposition that 
specifies the spoils system for top management positions) so as to extend 
its application additionally to external executives. 
 Thus, external executives are designated on a fiduciary basis and their 
appointment is terminated at the end of the legislature (or at every 
change of government during the legislature).  
This legislative intervention could have a negative impact on the 
executive structures. In fact, an improper utilization of external 
management ( which increases the number of fiduciary executives in 
public administration) may provoke a negative effect on the conditions of 
personal independence of the professional executives. 
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A report by the Italian Audit Office has underlined the anomalous use of 
external managerial appointments( Corte dei Conti, 2006).  
In particular, it shows an increase in the number of external 
appointments and also stresses that the appointed figures are hardly 
justified and the general criteria for the assignment and  the revocation 
of the appointments are not clearly specified. 
The same authority (with sentence n° 836/04) suggested the prerequisites 
for conferring external appointments. These are the lack of specific 
knowledge and experience in the administration; the necessity for 
activity geared towards resolving specific issues; the lack of appropriate 
staff within the administration; the specificity and temporariness of the 
appointments; shortage of certification of personnel, specific professional 
qualities required and adequate justification, which would permit the 
verification of the prerequisites produced (Nespor, 2006).  
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The assignment of external positions, in other words, should be 
characterized by the exceptionality; conferment modalities  that do not 
reflect the above-mentioned criteria actually violate not only the 
normative prescriptions, but also the constitutional principle stated in  
the art. 97, par. 3. 
An analysis by the Audit Office reveals an instrumental use of external 
management and the spoils system by politicians. In particular, these 
instruments are used to build a fiduciary team (in state managerial 
structures) operating without any respect for the principles of 
impartiality and transparence, which ought to regulate the actions of 
public offices (Talamo, 2007). 
This description underlines the lack of criteria regarding the conferment 
of external managerial appointments in the public administration and 
this vague situation could allow politicians to abuse power with regard to 
this kind of position.  
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The above mentioned situation could be rather demotivating for internal 
managers, because they could realize that, in order to advance one’s 
career, it is more advantageous to follow political directives than it is to 
work efficiently and effectively in the drive for improved performance. 
 
6. Instruments influencing the executive’s actions: organization 
restructuring 
The legislative decree 300/99 ( art. 4 par. 1 ) assigns the adoption of 
organization restructuring to public sources, such as government 
regulations and ministerial decrees. This possibility is often exploited by 
political authorities to operate the systematic removal of managers, the 
phenomenon being called a “disguised” spoils system( Merloni, 2007).  
This is another instrument that might increase the politician’s power and 
induce executives to be more open to political intervention at  the 
management level.  
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It is very difficult to show its real influencing aim, because it is quite 
complicated to demonstrate that organization restructuring is only 
motivated by the wish to remove undesired executives. 
Therefore, the frequency and scope of organization restructuring in the 
public administration could have a negative effect on the stability of 
managerial positions . 
This consideration can be emphasized through analysis of the effects of 
organization restructuring carried out in the Economic Development 
Ministry, in application of  the law n. 122/08 . 
This law indicates the need for reform of certain Ministries and stipulates 
(for administrations which have carried out a transfer of duties) that the 
organizational structures are to be redefined through the ministerial 
regulations laid down in art. 4 par. 1 Legislative decree 300/99. 
The analysis of organization restructuring carried out in the Economic 
Development Ministry shows that only nine general level  managers 
101 
 
were confirmed out of a total of twenty one offices of this kind which are 
provided for in the Economic Development Ministry system. This 
happened even though the organizational modifications resulted , in 
many cases, in only a re-allocation or  re-denomination of  the existing 
offices, or their unification( Club Dirigenti P.A., 2009).  
Non-confirmed managers were transferred to another post or their 
appointments were terminated in advance. The managers were either 
moved from their operative duties to research activity or obtained an 
ordinary managerial position, because they had not completed  the three 
years (in the general managerial position) required to accede to the first 
managerial  level.(  art. 23 leg.decree 165/01). 
This outline demonstrates how organizational restructuring might allow 
politicians a generalized and anticipated exercise of their discretionary 
powers in the conferment of appointments, without respecting the 
normal  expiration terms for  the managerial position (D’Alessio, 2005,a). 
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This happens especially when organizational restructuring is rather 
frequent and not adequately justified. 
The problem is not only to guarantee  the manager’s rights (i.e. the right 
to a stable job or the right  to carry out one’s duties without politicians 
interfering), but also to ensure the continuity of administrative activity 
in the interests of citizens and the Nation as a whole. 
 
7. The law 15/09  and  the legislative decree 150/09 
Recently,  new measures ( law 15/09 and legislative decree 150/09) have 
been adopted in the public management sector, with the aim of 
improving performance in the public administration and modifying 
public management regulation ( provided by legislative decree 165/01) in 
order to implement the principle of separation between orientation and 
management functions. 
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The above mentioned provisions involve only some of the instruments 
influencing executives’ actions, as outlined above. 
 More specifically, these measures aim to modify the rules concerning 
career development of professional executives, stipulating that, in order 
to accede to the first management level, it is necessary to pass a specific 
public competition. This mechanism is applicable only to a select number 
( 50%) of the available vacant positions. 
The normative covers the issue of employment of external management  
drafting a new regulation for external appointments that deals with the 
criteria for the individuation of the minimal prerequisites that external 
managers ought to possess in order to obtain the appointments. However, 
it does not advocate a reduction in their number. 
Apart from the above mentioned profiles these measures are rather vague 
as regards the relationship between politics and administration under the 
functional and structural profiles(Capano, 2009). 
104 
 
With regard to the functional profile, in fact, Article 6 par. 1 of law 15/09 
states that “ the exercise of the delegation is geared towards enhancing 
the principle of separation between orientation and management 
functions and aims to regulate the relationships between politicians and 
upper-level managers so as to guarantee the full and coherent realization 
of government policies in the administrative field”. 
This norm does not specifically address the issue of managerial 
autonomy. It has been observed, on the contrary, “that the main interest 
of the law is to exploit the legitimation of the spoils system provided by 
the Constitutional Court rulings to enforce the fiduciary tie between  top 
management and politicians” (D’Alessio, 2009)  . 
On the other hand, as regards the structural profile, Art. 6 par. 2 assigns 
to the  Government “the task of redefining the criteria for conferment, 
change and revocation of managerial appointments on the basis of the 
principles of the constitutional and  the jurisdictional  field”. 
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Therefore the law  15/09 was too generic and allowed the government to 
have considerable discretionary powers in its implementation. In fact 
even though the normative calls to mind the principles of the 
constitutional field it does not specify what exactly these principles are. 
With the above considerations in mind, it is possible to affirm that the 
law 15/09 has provided few accurate principles and directive criteria. 
Highlight the above considerations it is possible to conclude that 
although these measures do present some interesting elements, they do 
not seem to provide solutions for resolving issues regarding the presence, 
in the Italian system, of instruments which might potentially be used by 
politicians to influence a manager’s activities and his/her managerial 
autonomy. 
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8. Case study; Ministry of Transportations and Infrastructure             
In order to confirm our hypotheses, we interviewed the Head of the 
Evaluation and Control Department, Ministry of Transportation and 
Infrastructure1, in order to get his opinion about how the new regulation, 
at the management level, concedes to managers greater autonomy from 
politicians. 
The interview was realized through short questions regarding the above 
mentioned issues related to the relationships between politicians and 
public managers. The answers to these questions was immediate and 
short as well. 
The interview was based around the consideration that the normative 
introduced by the reform does not entirely fulfill this purpose. Our 
interviewee pointed out three factors which might affect managerial 
autonomy .  
                                                 
1
  Mr. Ciro Esposito is a top manager who has worked in several public administrations. He is an engineer and 
now he is developing an activity regarding the evaluation and control of  the employers’  performance into the Ministry 
of Transports and Infrastructures.  
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The first is represented by the spoils system and by organization 
restructuring. The Head of Department confirms that these instruments 
can create an influencing situation because they prevent managers from 
freely exercising their duties. 
While the spoils system only concerns the top management positions, 
organization restructuring has more radical effects, considering that it 
can involve not only the top management positions, but also all the 
managerial positions in the administration ( top , general and ordinary 
managerial positions ). 
The second aspect regards the extensive employment of external 
managers, who are often chosen not for their specific competences,  but 
for their political affiliations. 
The Head of Department thinks that this phenomenon might be rather 
demotivating for internal managers, because they might realize that, in 
order to advance one’s career, it is more advantageous to follow political 
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directives than it is to work efficiently and effectively in the drive for 
improved performance. According to top managers, it is one of the 
principal reasons preventing the concrete application of  the principle of  
functional  separation within the  public administration. 
The last critical point regards the phenomenon of the managerial group, 
which develops in response to political influencing. The Head of 
department affirms that, in the public administration, executives often 
set up internal groups whose aim is to facilitate the career progression of 
the managers belonging to these groups.  
This might happen, for example, with top executives employing their 
power to confer appointments, over secondary managers ( art. 19 par. 5 
leg.decree 165/01).General managers usually appoint executives who 
have followed their recommendations in their managerial decisions and 
have thus demonstrated their loyalty. Because of this situation, career  
development in managerial positions depends on one’s belonging to 
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groups such as these rather than being based on the executive’s skills and 
competences. 
The interview confirms the critical aspects of the normative as pointed 
out in the first part of the chapter. It also endorses the need for fresh 
regulation to rectify the structural ambiguities which do not allow a 
thorough application of the principle of functional separation. 
 
9. Hypotheses for legislative innovation 
It is possible to hypothesize certain modifications to the legislation 
which would aim to correct the normative ambiguities described above. 
These measures should address those causes that prevent the application 
of the principle of  functional separation( Merloni, 2007).  
In particular, in order to achieve this purpose, the following solutions 
might be adopted. 
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1)  Rethinking the politicians’ powers of nomination. This might be 
feasible, first  of all, by limiting the power of political nomination only to 
cases of top management positions and those appointments betraying 
political leanings. The power of nomination ought to be regulated by 
procedures which are geared towards guaranteeing the correctness and 
the quality of the choices. A system of criteria should also be introduced 
combining the evaluation of subjective qualities and objective elements , 
so as to reduce the discretionary character of the choices. 
 2) Intervening on the duration of the managerial appointment. With 
regard to this, two different solutions might be suggested (Merloni, 
2006). The first requires the elimination of the temporary-contract 
managerial appointment. This does not mean that managers will be 
immobilized in their positions but, on the contrary, it presumes the 
creation of a modern and functioning evaluation system( Talamo,2005).  
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Another hypothesis might be to regulate the duration of the appointment 
in accordance with the different structural and functional characteristics 
of each task( Talamo,2007). A permanent appointment could be accorded 
in the event of conferments of a technical function and functions which 
do not come under the influence of political orientation. 
At the end of the appointment, the introduction of a manager’s right to 
receive confirmation of a function or an equivalent assignation, might 
also be suggested, if the person in question has received a positive 
evaluation of his/her activities; this might avoid those precarious 
situations which involve political influencing of an executive’s actions. 
This right should also be recognized for managers that have lost their 
positions due to organization restructuring. 
3) Following the Constitutional Court’s rulings regarding the spoils 
system. With regard to this profile, the Court has stipulated that the 
termination of the appointment must be preceded by an evaluation of the 
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manager’s activity, to justify the termination of the appointment 
(considering also the new governmental objectives ). 
The constitutional principle of impartiality ( art. 97) represents a value 
that has to regulate the organization of public offices (Allegretti,1993). Its 
purpose is to ensure the autonomy of managers from politicians and to 
allow technical evaluations without political interference. To accomplish 
this principle, it is necessary to guarantee the continuity and the stability 
of the managerial position.  
For this reason, there is a need for a legislative intervention geared 
towards creating an objective and functional evaluation 
system(D’Alessio, 2009). In fact, in the Italian regulation there is no 
procedural passage where the administration might state the reasons for 
the early termination of an appointment( which could also be related to a 
new government’s objectives) and where the manager might have the 
opportunity to defend his/her position . 
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4) Using external managers only in the event of a lack of necessary 
professional competences within the administrations, and assigning the 
position only to those persons who have specific and certified 
prerequisites(Talamo, 2007). 
Criteria and limitations should be introduced to avoid abuse of the 
above-mentioned  scenario. These abuses have also occurred as a result of  
an increase in the number of  positions of this kind created by the 
normative in the last few years. 
 Therefore, it is necessary to rethink the number of  external 
appointments and their  terms, in order to motivate internal professionals 
and to avoid assigning managerial duties to subjects linked too closely to 
politicians. 
 We suggest regulating  the employment of external managers, abolition 
of  re-confirmation for this kind of appointment (conferred for a limited 
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period) and the provision of a public competition to cover the vacant 
posts when it is not possible to exploit  internal resources.  
 
Conclusions 
On the basis of the above-mentioned findings, we might conclude that 
the new regulation introduced by the reform has not fully accomplished 
its aims. 
 It has provided instruments that may be used  in the public 
administration to reduce managerial autonomy and to allow politicians to 
gain influencing powers over a  manager’s activities. 
For these reasons, we put forward hypotheses for  legislative innovation 
aimed at  rectifying the ambiguities introduced by the new regulation. 
This work represents only the point of departure of a longer work  
aiming  to analyze all the critical aspects concerning the relationship 
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between politicians and public executives in the new scenario created by 
the reform of the Italian public administration. 
 It has exclusively adopted a legal studies approach to show that the 
reform will probably not accomplish its main objectives (such as the 
separation of functions between politicians and managers and the 
recognition of greater managerial autonomy to public executives)  
especially  since  it was initially  not well designed  by the legislator . 
The next stages  of our work will consist in  going into greater depth 
with regard to the juridical issues appearing  in this work; it will also 
consist in its implementation, because we understand that in order to 
carry out a complete field analysis it is necessary to consider other 
relevant areas and topics, such as, planning & control systems enhancing 
accountability, career and retribution systems and  other organizational 
mechanisms ; and , lastly, it will be based on the carrying out of further 
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case studies in order to gather the information and empirical data needed 
to sustain  a general field analysis . 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE EVALUATION OF PUBLIC MANAGERS’ PERFORMANCES IN 
THE LIGHT OF ITALIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM 
 
 
 
Abstract 
One of the most important element in the analysis of public 
administration’s performances is the management. In fact it is the 
connection point between objectives (fixed at political level) and the 
system of outputs and outcomes, achieved by public personnel at 
different levels.  
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This is the main reason why during the last decades, the reform of Italian 
public administration has concentrated on improving public action 
performances, by a regulation of public management and the connected 
introduction of two key words: autonomy and accountability. This means 
that managers should be endowed of greater autonomy in the execution 
of their managerial activities and, at the same time, they are fully 
responsible for both personnel’s and whole body’s performance. 
Even thought the legislative decrees nr. 286/99 (art.5) and nr. 165/01 
(art.19-21) introduced an evaluation and control system of managers’ 
activities, they have been applied with a very little success inside public 
administration. The reason is that evaluation has been realized in a 
bureaucratic way, often by the use of a great number of general 
indicators, which do not concretely reflect actual organizational 
processes and related outcomes.  
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According to the above considerations, it could be stated that the reform 
of the Italian public administration did not completely accomplish its 
two fundamental goals.  
First of all, it did not recognize a greater autonomy to managers, 
considering that in the Italian system there are many instruments which 
can be used by politicians to affect managers’ executive action and, on 
the other hand , it has provided a managers’ performance evaluation 
system which is not compliant to the reality.  
However, according to these themes, a new discipline has been recently 
provided by the legislative decree nr. 150/09. Its aim is to introduce a 
concrete system of measures and indicators, which are oriented to ensure 
the accountability of public managers’ activities. 
The purpose of this chapter is to verify why managers’ performance 
evaluation system provided by legislative decrees nr. 286/99 and nr. 
165/01 was not proper and well-functioning; to analyze the changes 
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introduced by the new discipline and, finally, to verify if such 
innovations are really able to realize an adequate evaluation system of 
public managers’ performances, in order to built a strong feedback flow 
for the review of personnel policies. 
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               Introduction  
Up until the changes brought about by law 15/2009 (passed in 1992-3 
and integrated in 1997-8) and its various executive decrees, public 
administration and public work reform in Italy was based on several 
fundamental principles. These included: the principle of separation of 
politics and administrative management; the reinforcing of managerial 
autonomy and responsibility; privatization/contracting of employer-
employee relations and reform of trade union relations; the introduction 
of managerial techniques typical of the private sector, including the 
handling of human resources. This programme’s approach drew its 
inspiration from ‘new public management’, Public Choice and the 
economic theories of organization that aimed to remove all differences 
between the public and private sectors of the economy(Hood 1991 e 
1995) . 
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In particular, the issues of management and regulation of managerial 
roles are at the centre of critical thinking regarding the applicative 
experience of the reform process in the nineties. 
According to most authors many of the novel elements introduced by the 
reform “haven’t worked”, either because of shortcomings in the original 
norms, unsatisfactory application, or failed implementation. Among the 
shortcomings, we find, above all, an inadequate or unrealistic 
configuration of the manager’s commanding and organizational role, not 
only in his/her relationship with the political powers, but also in his/her 
role as trade union counterpart. Among the poorly applied solutions we 
find the discipline of managerial appointments, both with regard to 
permanent-contract managers and to so-called external managers, taken 
on short-term contracts (and without public selection) and the connected 
problem of the spoils system. Thirdly, assessment of management has 
never really taken off or has not produced the expected results, both 
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through the negligence of those involved, but also because of poor initial 
planning. 
More specifically, the failed implementation of the virtuous circle, which 
the reform had proposed to launch (included among the discipline of 
managerial appointments, assessment procedures and managerial 
responsibility) could be blamed on contingent factors and bad practices 
that these have generated (failure to single out management goals, 
assessments of a merely formal nature, non-functioning of mechanisms 
attributable to managerial and disciplinary responsibility, indiscriminate 
distribution of economic incentives with no control over results); at the 
same time “certain structural blind-spots in the present normative 
framework” also emerge, with a specific focus on “excessive, 
uncontrolled and uncontrollable links between politics and 
management”. 
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The relationship between political organs and administrative 
management almost always takes centre stage, and in particular, the 
problem of how to ensure management autonomy and safeguard it from 
political interference, as a condition for implementing the constitutional 
principles of impartiality and successful functioning of public 
administrations. 
In this context the profound relevance of assessing management cannot 
be underestimated; it represents  an “element of closure of the whole 
system” (Talamo 2007:137), an indispensible link both for activating the 
virtuous circle of autonomy/responsibility (in the name of the principle 
of healthy functioning) and for stemming the discretionary power of 
political organs in order to safeguard management autonomy and the 
impartiality of its actions. 
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1.  Assessment of public management  
According to many authors one of the weak points of the reform in the 
nineties lay in the implementation of management assessment( Zoppoli, 
2008). 
The instrument under examination is of primary importance in the 
construction of a modern public management figure geared towards 
expressing “organisational logic” ( Rusciano, 1993); this is a precious 
resource to be exploited in such a way that the organisation may carry 
out a specific political programme, providing competitive, quality results. 
Only through assessment, do elements such as the conferment of 
appointments, exceptional discipline, and managerial responsibility 
assume a precise meaning. 
Laying importance on the assessment of the performance of the manager 
means inducing him/her to demonstrate the capacities and powers of a 
private employer with a view to the results to be achieved. The manager 
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is forced to define in responsible fashion his personal strategies, making 
use of instruments recognised by law: managerial power, power of 
control, sanctioning power, assessment of personnel and analysis of 
performance with a view to improvement and learning, handling of 
prizes. For all this he/she will assume the necessary responsibility with 
regard to the organisation to which he/she belongs. 
Management assessment was initially regulated in the bill d.lgs. n. 29/93 , 
but it was with d.lgs. 30 July, 1999, no. 286, that there an organic and 
integrated discipline of internal controls began to take shape. Of course, 
the afore-mentioned normative source contained uncertainties and 
several failings. It should in fact be stressed that d.lgs. no. 286/99 was 
rather unclear in its mechanisms for setting objectives and some of the 
solutions adopted succeeded in weakening the assessment organs. For 
example, this happened in the case of the assessment nuclei because of 
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the lack of clear intervention geared towards preserving their functional 
autonomy and precisely defining roles. 
The socio-organisational logic proposed in d.lgs. n. 286/99 was 
substantially ignored for reasons connected to both management and 
politics, thus adding to the structural difficulties.  In fact it is a commonly 
held opinion that the political component had actually given up 
governing with competitive strategies( Natalini, 2009). 
To this can be added a symmetrical position in the management 
hierarchy, for whom activating assessment systems means an increase in 
responsibility in accordance with one’s own position Battini, 2009). All 
this produced an inevitable exchange between politicians and managers( 
Merloni, 2006)  on the basis of which the former were to “actually 
introduce themselves into administrative management”, whereas the 
latter would receive “monetization (salary increases not based on 
evaluation of management results) for the assuming of exclusive 
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responsibilities connected to the exercising of their duties”. This 
degeneration undoubtedly led to the sacrificing of the idea of the 
virtuous circle, based on healthy management functioning.  
There was, therefore, a clear opportunity for a normative intervention in 
the juridical framework of assessment. The afore-mentioned intervention 
was implemented through the bill d.lgs 150/09. 
One should be aware that for a correct ascertaining of results of the 
assessments proposed by d.lgs. n. 150/09 it will be necessary to wait for 
the outcome of its application; nonetheless, under a strictly juridical 
profile the exegesis of the formulation of the normative provisions seems 
to be indispensable for the subsequent verification of applicative 
practices.  In fact, as an initial premise, we should be asking ourselves if 
the norms can overcome the problems emerging from the application of 
the normative thus far in force( Zoppoli, 2008), whether they have 
within themselves the instruments to consent a functioning of the 
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system of assessment of personnel and management, real and not merely 
formal, and if they are able to create a virtuous circle ( Morciano, 2009), 
fostered by the proclaimed reinforcing of the actual managerial roles. 
The goals of this article are: 1) to highlight the critical state elements 
present in the system of assessment operating before the Brunetta 
reform; 2) to proceed to a critical analysis of the normative provisions 
introduced by d.lgs. n. 150/09 with regard to evaluation of individual 
performance, in order to single out which are: 
a) the positive and disciplined aspects in a clear manner in the provisions 
in question; 
b) the elements presenting a need for clarification because of an 
imprecise normative formulation or because of a lack of internal co-
ordination in the normative provisions; 
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c) the deficit elements which might have opportunely welcomed an 
intervention on the part of the legislator in order to create instruments 
capable of getting the system to work in an optimal manner. 
 
2.  Critical state elements in the assessment system operating before d.lgs 
150/09  
2.1.  Politicisation in management assessment  
The system in force before the 2009 reform provided for an assessment 
handled entirely by  political bodies, which had the responsibility of 
laying down objectives and carrying out the evaluation. The afore-
mentioned formulation resulted in poor functioning of the assessment 
system. In fact, it is quite legitimate for political bodies to determine the 
policies; but the existence of these political factions alone, of whatever 
type, is not sufficient to identify and show off a real responsibility for 
results.  The goals and the connected indicators of realisation should 
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emerge from these lines of policy, as long as assessment of the extent to 
which the goals have been achieved can be conjugated with assessment 
of organisational behaviour. It is in relation to these profiles that the 
norms in questions are shown to be lacking inasmuch that they have not 
provided for instruments geared towards reducing the inappropriate 
intrusion of politics and have not provided for any procedural measures 
for eliminating all forms of judgement, in order to ensure the maximum 
possible impartiality in assessing the performance of any single manager.  
At this point there are two main aspects, in particular, to analyse: 1. the 
setting of goals 2. the subjects who will carry out the assessment. 
 
a) Politicisation in the setting of goals (sections 19 of d. lgs. n. 165/2001 
and 5 of d. lgs. n. 286/1999). 
As regards the setting of objectives, section 19 of d. lgs. n. 165/2001, 
stipulated that, with the conferring of the appointment, the reasons for 
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the appointment and the goals to be achieved should be singled out, with 
reference to priorities, in the plans and programmes as laid down by the 
governing bodies with their specific policies and any potential alterations 
to the latter, which might arise during the relationship. 
It can be deduced from this norm that the objective, like the 
appointment, should be assigned to the manager using the same 
unilateral measures, which may be periodically modified, again in 
unilateral fashion. This is an interpretation that reduces managerial 
responsibility and assessment regarding the regulating of conferment of 
appointments, creating a discipline characterised by an intrinsic handling 
immobility and a dangerous overburdening of programmatory 
expectations. How is it, in fact, possible that at the moment of conferring 
appointments there can be such a precise awareness of objectives and 
resources for carrying them out, to project oneself forward, very 
approximately, for the subsequent three years at least? Is there not a risk 
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in this way of including in the appointment extremely vague objectives 
that are substantially inadequate for precipitating real and proper 
managerial responsibility? The fleeting reference in section 19 d. lgs. n. 
165/2001 to “potential alterations” is also so general and all-inclusive as 
to suggest that any modification of the initial objective can only lead to 
priority modifications, simple programmes and lines of policy. In the 
light of the above considerations it can be seen that section 19 d. lgs. n. 
165/2001, rather than being defective as regards the concrete ways for 
assessing management and investing it with responsibility for results that 
are both imagined, in order to ensure, on the one hand, the unilateral 
nature of conferring appointments, and, on the other hand, a minimum 
duration of the appointment itself, rightly fixed at three years so as not to 
render management too precarious a phenomenon. These are important 
requirements that need to be safeguarded, although they concern the 
static and structural profile of public organisation, and the balance 
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between subjects and powers that spark off “entrepreneurial function”; at 
the same time they seem to relegate to an inferior position the dynamic-
managerial aspect of management assessment, without which, however, 
the functioning of the whole system, as already mentioned, might be 
jeopardized. 
The norms proved to be rather ambiguous as regards reference to the 
manager’s rights of appointment and assessment, creating a considerable 
risk of confusion between the minimum term of appointment and 
systems of evaluation. 
 
b) Politicisation in individuating assessors. 
With regard to subjects who have to supervise the process of annual 
assessment, d. lgs. n. 286/1999  adopts a model tried and tested in the 
private sector, where, most importantly, the protagonist in the 
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assessment of results is a manager, acting in accordance with strategies, 
policy and lines of responsibility singled out by company organs. 
However, the discipline under examination limited itself to establishing 
the principle of the direct dependence of support structures on the 
organs of the political group, completely neglecting the need to lay down 
homogeneous principles in relation to the functional autonomy of these 
organisms and to the extension of their roles. In the way in which it was 
formulated the discipline of assessment has contributed considerably 
towards the politicisation of assessment organs and to a huge 
“corporation-style” mode of functioning. All this is probably one of the 
main reasons why assessment has not produced the expected effects; in 
particular a system of assessment of managerial performance that 
consents real comparison has been lacking. 
In comparison with the private sector, what has, in fact, been forgotten is 
that it is not possible to compare results among public administrations 
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commencing from their market presence. Assessment that exhausts itself 
in each organisational dimension is bound to be influenced by the old 
and new characteristics of each organisation, without there being a 
moment of truth regarding the results which that particular 
administration manages to produce externally, for citizens and other 
administrations. There is little doubt that the discipline of subjects 
manifested all its shortcomings, rendering assessment of managerial 
performance an affair internal to the administrations and bureaucratic 
management. 
Furthermore, the discipline under examination has not introduced 
objectives and indicators capable of substituting more effectively the 
absence of parameters deducible from an actual real market, and has 
greatly reduced the role of assessment nuclei. 
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2.2.  Applicative dysfunctions of section 5, d.lgs. n. 286/99   
The system of assessment of management as laid down by section 5, d.lgs. 
n. 286/99 has been characterised by a formal application of the normative 
provisions, often with broadly positive evaluations, generally speaking, 
certainly not symptomatic of the system’s efficiency (seeing the 
administrations’ unsatisfactory output), so much as an element 
highlighting applicative disorders (Gagliarducci,Tardiola,2008). An 
upward projection of the evaluations has shown, as a consequence, that 
they have no influence on concrete effects on the career of the person 
being assessed, and on the diversification of retributive dynamics. Thus, 
although this praxis has widely consented the obtaining of result-based 
retribution from the angle of “immediate reward” (i.e. the retributive 
aspect), from the “medium-term”-reward perspective (i.e. that which is 
linked to the selecting of subsequent appointments) a generally-speaking 
positive assessment has compromised the possibility of discovering the 
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real managerial capabilities of each single manager, hindering a possible 
comparison of various candidates for a single appointment. As regards 
the “disciplinary” angle, managerial responsibility linked to assessment 
was not in fact implemented, and has often been side-stepped through 
legislative interventions containing annulments that content politicians 
but are not linked to (lacking) managerial professionalism.  
 
3. Prospects for analysis of present legislative data 
Section 5, d.lgs. n. 286/99 has now been repealed by the Brunetta decree 
and the provisions relating to public managerial assessment have been 
included in a series of norms to be found in Document II and Document 
III of d.lgs 150/09. 
In the following paragraphs we shall be endeavouring to verify whether 
the new norms: 
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1.- have overcome the problems relating to identifying objectives when 
conferring managerial appointments, these being the indispensable 
presupposition for correct assessment of managerial-level personnel; 
2.- maintain their “guarantees” during the managerial assessment process 
(on the basis of repeated requests by the Constitutional Court); 
3 might have repercussions for the main institutes linked to the system of 
assessment, i.e. a) to the conferment of new and subsequent 
appointments; b) to managerial responsibility.  
 
4.  The necessary presuppositions for managerial assessment: towards a 
correct role for the political element 
In the sphere of distinction between politics and administration, the 
former is given the task of identifying objectives and the latter the task of 
implementing them with managerial autonomy correlated to the 
required managerial responsibility; in order to be able to assess first one 
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needs to plan, i.e. individuate and subsequently assign objectives 
(Gagliarducci,Tardiola,2008). Although it is central and strategic, the 
moment of programming has thus far witnessed a lack of attention on the 
part of politicians responsible for policy, with a corresponding failure to 
transfer the objectives to managerial appointments. Going back to the 
initial delegating law, the so-called Brunetta reform has devoted little 
space (q.v. section 4, comma 2, lett. b) l. n. 15/09)  to the fundamentally 
important “planning” issue; nor has much more space been devoted by 
the delegating decree, where the individuation of objectives is inserted 
mainly between section 5, d.lgs.n. 150/09 (objectives and indicators) and 
section 10, d.lgs. n. 150/09 (performance plan and report on 
performance). This planning, in the final version of the Brunetta decree, 
is placed, fairly and coherently, in the system of distinction between 
politics and administration, in the hands of the political-administrative 
policy-makers* with the involvement of upper management. 
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In the three-year planning phase attention to the need for a collective 
approach certainly emerges as a positive factor, along with individuation 
of correspondence between objectives and resources, the highlighting of 
the specific nature and clarity of objectives, which should also be 
measurable and comparable with defined standards at the national “and 
international” level. This programme takes shape in the “Performance 
plan” (Q.v. section 10, d.lgs. n. 150/09). This Plan, to be adopted by 
January 31, for State administrations( Barrera), “contains” the Minister’s 
annual directives, singling out the strategic and operational objectives 
and defining the indicators for measurement and assessment of 
administration performance and the objectives to be assigned to 
managers. Thus the formulation of the normative can be viewed in a 
positive light; with the help of the Committee (Q.v. section 13, d.lgs. n. 
150/09( Natalini, 2009)) it requires programme contents that will 
hopefully be translated into adequately specific objectives, but  one 
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cannot help noticing that the provision is lacking with regard to the 
propulsive phase, providing instead for “disciplinary relapses” that do not 
affect the politician so much as the management. In fact the corrective 
measures implemented by the legislator as a suitable instrument for 
encouraging policy-making are the ones in section 10, comma 5, d.lgs. n. 
n. 150/09, which establishes that: “In the event of failure to adopt or 
update annually the Performance Plan, result-based retribution to those 
managers who have been shown to play a part in the failed adoption of 
the Plan should be stopped, because of omission or inaction in carrying 
out their duties, and the administration must not proceed to take on 
personnel or make appointments for denominated consultants or 
collaborators”. Failure to adopt the Performance Plan on the part of State 
administration will therefore have repercussions on personnel with 
managerial appointments; this would confirm the essentially punitive 
approach to management, without there being present a balancing with a 
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counterweight that might induce the politicians responsible for policy to 
programme in terms as laid down by the normative. This provision has 
been confirmed in several parts of the decree, which, on the other hand, 
is lacking with regard to the presence of a disincentive for delays (equally 
important), which acts as an impulse to politicians, balancing up the 
normative provisions 
 
5. The individuation of objectives for the manager and the significance 
of assessment in the conferment of subsequent appointments.  
The issue of conferment of appointments, which we shall be analysing 
here, is closely linked to  the political sphere:  
- Under the profile/presupposition (for assessment) of the need to 
confer appointments “for objectives”;  
- Under the profile/consequence (of assessment) of the need to bear in 
mind the results obtained previously and obtained through the system of 
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assessment of performance for the conferment of subsequent 
appointments. 
With reference to the former issue there have been difficulties up to this 
moment in time in arranging for managerial appointments “for 
objectives”. Yet the novelty of the normative, especially in the 
formulation linked to the so-called second privatisation of public work, 
“lay not in the conferment of abstractly preordained managerial 
functions, but in the configurations of specific appointments, 
corresponding to the characteristics of the actions to be carried out”; thus 
“all appointments of second level managerial offices are marked by 
features of such concreteness as to justify the conferment”, both “under 
the objective profile of their coherence with the framework of  
administrative political tendency deliberated during the years in 
government” and  “under the subjective profile of the subsistence of 
suitable skills, and the professional capacities of each manager, backed up 
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by previously achieved results” (Audit office – Resolution, January 24, 
2002, n. 6). It would therefore have been necessary to individuate in 
punctual fashion “the duties assigned to each manager, and with regard 
to these, the objectives to be pursued and the relative scale of priorities”. 
This specification is necessary both for a suitable placement for the 
manager, on the basis of his/her own professionalism, and also in order to 
be able to carry out an assessment that might allow one to individuate 
his/her possible responsibilities* (Resolution, 22 March, 2001, n. 19) and 
to allocate diversified retributive treatments*”. In spite of this normative 
it is widely accepted that up to now, there does not seem to have been a 
concrete implementation of the provision, as stressed several times by 
the Audit office in its powers of preventive control (q.v. section 3, 
comma 1, lett. b), l. n. 20/94) ( Bolognino, 2008).  
The bill, d.lgs. n. 150/09, refers to  “objectives to assign to managerial 
personnel” in section 10, comma 1, lett. a) in the drafting of the 
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Performance Plan, and in section 19, comma 1, as in a new formulation, 
however, as mentioned previously, the normative provision alone is not 
sufficient to guarantee its realisation and therefore, under this profile, it 
will be fundamental to proceed to a real implementation of the 
normative, because the individuation of precise objectives for 
management preludes among other things the possibility of 
implementing the system of assessment effectively and efficiently.  
With reference to the other profile of analysis (i.e. the relationship 
between conferment of appointments and evaluations of managers; in 
the past it does not seem that assessment had assumed a preponderant 
importance as a subjective element capable of affecting, as a plus value or 
as a deminutio of a manager’s professional capacity, influencing 
decisively the conferment of new and subsequent appointments. This 
scenario is certainly the consequence of a system of assessment that has 
had trouble taking off and therefore could not help remaining ineffective 
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with regard to the conferment of new and subsequent managerial 
appointments. In the new normative a positive aspect that emerges is the 
reference to the relationship between the results of assessment and 
“attribution of appointments and responsibility” (Q.v. in particular, 
section 25, d.lgs. n. 150/09). This section reinforces the content of section 
19, d.lgs. n. 165/01, which stipulates that for conferment of managerial 
appointments one must bear in mind one’s pre-set objectives, the 
complexity of the structure, results achieved and the assessment 
previously obtained by the manager him/herself  specifying that the 
certified professionalism in the system of assessment is a criterion on the 
basis of which (together with the others) to confer appointments. In this 
situation however, the system will also produce effects in the conferment 
of subsequent appointments only if, and to the extent to which, the 
system of assessment of performance functions adequately.   
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6.  With the aim of guaranteeing participation of the assessed subject in 
the assessment process. 
In the relationship between politics and administration based on a 
distinction between duties, in which the manager ought to handle 
his/her resources autonomously during his/her appointed term, 
assessment also absolves the important function of management 
guarantees and safeguard; management should be assessed for 
demonstrated skills and not for “political affinity” ( Bassanini, 2008), also 
as a direct consequence of all that has been effectively mentioned, i.e. 
“administration and institutions are at the service of the citizens and are 
instruments for guaranteeing and satisfying their rights. They are not at 
the service of the demands of political patronage( Bassanini, 2010).. In 
this context it is particularly important for the normative to individuate 
adequate guarantees for the assessed person during the performance 
assessment process; these guarantees have been mentioned several times 
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by the Constitutional Court, which, over a period of twenty years, has 
made rulings regarding the constitutional legitimacy of the provisions on 
the subject of so-called “privatisation” of the public sector and 
management-employee relationships. In sentence n. 103/07, the 
constitutional judge established that “assessment of a manager’s 
professional suitability should be based on criteria and procedures of an 
objective nature, inspired by principles of open public debate; only at the 
conclusion of this is it possible to carry out withdrawal or annulment”, 
which, in terms of guarantees, translates as “in a system of objective, 
transparent and participatory assessment of personnel appointed as 
management” ”( Bolognino, 2008). Here we should verify in particular 
whether the bill d.lgs. n. 150/09 provides the manager with adequate 
guarantees of participation during the assessment process. This guarantee 
referred expressly to the repealed section 5, d.lgs. n. 286/99 and 
translated, at least in theory, into participation during the assessment 
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process, through which a manager would have been placed in a position 
(in the event of failure to achieve objectives) to outline the possible 
internal and/or external hindrances which “exonerate him/her from 
responsibility”. The present normative regulation, in  section 7, al comma 
3, lett. b) d.lgs. n. 150/09, provides for the individuation of “procedures of 
conciliation relating to the application of the system of measurement and 
assessment of performance”. Therefore the perspective of the present 
provision, which is projected towards “conciliation” (which intervenes 
technically once assessment has been concluded) seems to have been 
altered. If the idea of the previous normative (or contractual) plan was to 
attribute negative assessment to the manager (wherever this could be 
demonstrated), this provision leads to a missed opportunity for public 
debate in the assessment phase (in order to arrive at a “posthumous” 
conciliation). The failure of this participatory phase leads to a reduction 
in guarantees for public managers during assessment of their 
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performance, further aggravated by an unsatisfactory modification to 
section 21, d.lgs. n. 165/01, where the request for the manager’s 
participation in the pathological moment is not very apparent. Only in its 
second part does the revised text of section 21, comma 1, d.lgs. n. 
165/2001 (relative to “serious” managerial responsibility), refer to 
“respect for the principle of public-debate”; this is not so for the 
application of the sanction of impossibility of renewal of appointment, 
where the request is only “subject to objection”, which is suitable for 
producing a further contraction of guarantees for the manager, reduced 
as much in the moment of assessment as it is (at least partly) in the 
pathological moment of application of the sanction (Q.v. section 21, 
comma 1, first section d.lgs. n. 165/01). 
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7.  Responsibility with reference to section 21, d.lgs. n. 165/01, in the 
light of the modifications introduced by the bill, d.lgs. n. 150/09.  
This last point is an analysis of the consequences of the results of the 
system of assessment concerning the disciplinary element, i.e. managerial 
responsibility. Perusing the text of the bill, d.lgs. n. 150/09, it is striking 
how many times the legislator uses the term  “responsibility”. One notes 
immediately how the meaning is now used in a different manner, in 
particular in the two reforms of the nineties (linked to enabling act n. 
421/92 and enabling act n. 59/97) where responsibility represented the 
other side of the coin of managerial autonomy. The so-called Brunetta 
decree, faced by a compression of managerial autonomy, has encouraged 
the proliferation of the hypothesis of responsibility; it should be stated 
that, alongside the most appropriate managerial responsibility (Q.v. 
section 21, d.lgs. n. 165/019), the following have also been introduced: 
fiscal responsibility for failed individuation by the manager responsible 
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for excesses on the part of personnel (in accordance with the law section 
33, comma 1, d.lgs. n. 165/01); various hypotheses for responsibility 
individuated by the legislator as disciplinary (Q.v. newly introduced 
section 55, bis comma 7, d.lgs. n. 165/01; section 55, sexies, d.lgs. n. 
165/01; section 55, septies, comma 6, d.lgs. n. 165/01;) and a hypothesis 
for civil responsibility (Q.v. the newly introduced section 55 sexies, 
comma 4, d.lgs. 165/0163).  
Clearly, with regard to our object of analysis, we should circumscribe our 
thoughts regarding the hypothesis of responsibility, which is more 
closely linked to the relationship with assessment, i.e. the hypothesis of 
responsibility (Q.v. section 21, d.lgs. n. 165/01), the application of which 
should be the direct consequence of negative results (attributable to the 
manager) in the system of assessment.  
The new role of the public manager (as distinguished from a role 
influenced by political leanings) should be autonomous, including 
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responsibility for appointments for fixed-term objectives; it is 
fundamental for the normative provisions relative to the relationship 
between assessment and managerial responsibility to guarantee a 
constitutionally obligatory balance between guarantee and sanction, so as 
to remove from the manager the yoke of “mere political approval”, in 
avoidance of the principles laid down in section 97 Cost. This balancing 
of guarantees must first of all be included among the provisions relative 
to assessment of personnel with managerial duties, and secondly must 
imply the clear formulation of provisions for managerial responsibility. 
The latter profile has been repeatedly highlighted by the Constitutional 
Court, which stresses the fact that an annulment of a managerial 
appointment may “merely be the consequence of certified managerial 
responsibility”, not only following the outcome of a “process of 
punctually disciplined guarantees”*, but also in the presence of 
“determined presuppositions”, thus preventing the unilateral 
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modifications on the part of the employer-employee relationship 
established by the employer from taking place outside “typified cases in 
the legal and contractual provisions”. Thus disciplinary interventions 
regarding the appointment and permanent contract employer-employee 
relationship must be grounded in the presuppositions demanded by the 
normative data and  therefore only in negative results of administrative 
or managerial activity or the failed achievement of objectives, i.e. 
“anyway for motivated organisational and managerial reasons, or 
following the ascertainment of negative results in management or non-
observance of directives” ( Bolognino, 2005). 
However, in the search for these guarantees, section 21, d.lgs. n. 165/01 
(already in the formulation prior to the bill d.lgs. n. 150/09) ( Bolognino, 
2005), presented a host of issues linked to its imprecise formulation*; 
these important problems were not resolved by the modifications 
brought by section 41 del d.lgs. n. 150/2009, which in certain instances 
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amplified them, especially also following the new hypothesis of 
responsibility introduced by comma 1 bis ( D’Alessio, Bolognino, 2010).  
Specifically:  
- comma 1, section 21, d.lgs. n. 165/01 in the post-d.lgs. n. 150/09 
formulation, continues to provide for a hypothesis of responsibility: a) 
failure to achieve certified objectives via the outcomes of the “system of 
assessment, Q.v. Document II of the legislative decree implementing the 
law, March 4, 2009, n. 15”; b) the non-observance of directives imputable 
to the manager. As disciplinary hypotheses the following continue to be 
present: a) the impossibility of renewal of the same managerial post; b) 
annulment of the appointment, thus allocating new roles to the manager 
(Q.v. section 23 del d.lgs. n. 165/2001); withdrawal of employer-
employee relationship in accordance with provisions in the collective 
contract;   
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- comma 1 bis, section 21, d.lgs. n. 165/01,  in the post-d.lgs. n. 150/09 
formulation, introduces a different hypothesis of responsibility providing 
for “the culpable violation of duty of vigilance of respect, on the part of 
the assigned personnel, for quantitative and qualitative standards fixed by 
the administration”, brings with it, as a sanction against the manager, “a 
reduction in resulting retribution, following hearings with the 
Committee of Guarantors, in proportion to the gravity of the violation, 
up to a total of 80%” 
At least three questions emerge from the normative data: 
. the link between the application of sanctions and the outcomes of the 
system of assessment;  
 . the reduction in guarantees for the weakened role of the judgement of 
the Committee of Guarantors; 
. perplexity arising from the new hypothesis of responsibility (Q.v. 
section 21, comma 1 bis, d.lgs. n. 165/01).  
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In relation to the link between the application of sanctions and the 
outcomes from the systems of assessment it can be seen that, as 
previously laid down by the Constitutional Court, it is extremely 
important to connect the criteria of assessment with disciplinary 
hypotheses, to which the manager will be called to answer, establishing a 
sort of parallelism between the provisions in question. This parallelism 
was less evident with the modifications brought to section 21, d.lgs. n. 
165/01 con l. n. 145/02, and also continues to be absent with the 
modifications brought to section 41 of d.lgs. n. 150/09. The objects of 
assessment are: a) the performance indicators relative to the 
organisational sphere of direct responsibility; b) the achievement of 
specific individual objectives; c) the quality of the contribution ensured 
by the general performance of the structure, professional and managerial 
skills demonstrated; d) assessment capacity of one’s own collaborators, 
demonstrated via a significant differentiation of judgements; in its 
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revised text Section 21 also continues, as an element for the attribution of 
responsibility (as well as non-observance of directives), to provide for the 
“failure to achieve objectives”. In terms of responsibility, it does not seem 
to take into consideration managerial capacity, which is also a very 
relevant element in assessment and, on the subject of sanctions, can 
entail greater attention being evoted to the role of manager. 
With regard to the second issue, considering, on the part of the political 
subject, the ample margin of choice of sanction to be inflicted, the 
situation becomes more serious with regard to guarantees made by 
managers in their professional capacity to modify section 22, d.lgs. n. 
165/01. On the other hand, section 21, d.lgs. n. 165/01 post d.lgs. n. 
150/09 continues to provide for the possibility of choice between 
annulment and withdrawal “in proportion to the gravity of the case”, 
without restoring a correspondence between gravity of responsibility and 
the disciplinary measures necessary to reduce the room for manoeuvre as 
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regards the arbitrary passing of sanctioning powers into the hands of 
political bodies. The increase in the political organ’s discretion had 
already been countered with  “l. n. 145/02”, a fictitious expansion of the 
hypotheses for recourse to the judgement of the Committee of 
Guarantors (an organ provided for by law). Thus the decision to apply 
sanctions to the manager is not left solely in the hands of the political 
subject( Mainardi, 2003) who is endeavouring to “recover in the 
procedural phase a possible deficit in safeguard, to be verified during the 
individuation of any conduct that might be sanctioned in terms of 
responsibility” ( Mainardi, 2003). This recovery of guarantees was not 
effective, bearing in mind the pre-existing possibility of inflicting 
sanctions without the Committee of Guarantors’ judgement, in the sense 
that “thirty days having passed from the time of the request without 
obtaining the judgement, it is possible to proceed without it”. The 
present, post-d.lgs. n. 150/09 normative formulation intervenes by 
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further weakening the standing of the judgement in question, which as a 
“true opinion”, and therefore binding (which it was in the text prior to 
the bill d.lgs. n. 150/2009), is converted into the present formulation 
(post-d.lgs. n. 150/2009) in the form of a mere “opinion heard” from the 
Committee of Guarantors( D’Alessio, 2009).  
As for the third issue, in the new “comma 1 bis of section 21, d.lgs. n. 
165/01”, there has been an evident shift away from the apportionment of 
responsibilities and not a simplification( Boscati, 2009), wherever the 
failure to respect qualitative and quantitative standards might have been 
classified with a general  assessment of the manager’s operations, with 
the application of sanctions, as laid down in “comma 1”, absorbing the 
preliminary and instrumental moment of vigilance( D’Alessio, 2009). All 
the same, it is the formulation of the normative, which hinges on 
“omitted vigilance”, hinting at the manager’s role as “controller” and not 
manager”( Santucci, Mora, 2009), that seems to accentuate the presence 
162 
 
of the subjective component of this hypothesis of responsibility( 
Borgongelli, 2009), with the consequent necessity to have to reflect on 
the correctness of its inclusion in section 21, d.lgs. n. 165/2001. 
 
Conclusions 
Taking the ideas expressed above as our cue we might state that the 
theme of assessment follows (in the structuring of the bill d.lgs. 27 
October, 2009 n. 150) a line of development that is not always so linear 
when compared to the conceptual principles adopted by the previous 
regulatory system. The precise choice of enhancing the role of the 
manager, as exclusive possessor of the power to manage human resources 
(section 6, l., 4 March, 2009, n. 15 and in that sense Q.v. section 37 d.lgs. 
n. 150/09) is counterbalanced by a complex normative framework from 
which numerous ways of conditioning managerial activity emerge. This 
is primarily the result of the progressive weakening of those channels 
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through which the manager should have been carrying out his duties and 
also of the method used, based on cloaking organisational rules in a 
normative guise 
In fact, the reform legislator has introduced an element of discontinuity, 
when compared to the past situation, since he has given considerable 
importance to the role assumed by the law in regulating the micro-
organisational dynamics. The norm has become the instrument with 
which to pursue efficient and effective results. The rules for governing 
the administrative apparatus are no longer self-made; they function 
according to the particularity of the services provided, the external 
dimension of reference and the countless contextual variables which 
every organisation has to confront, and represent the end-product of 
laws applied in a unitary fashion in all administrations. The most 
expressive example is to be found in the normative framework of a cycle 
of performance management. By entrusting the configuration to an 
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organic and detailed discipline such as that of bill d.lgs. n. 150/09, one 
might risk obstructing the smooth functioning, without taking into 
account the differences between the various administrations( Rebora, 
2009). Moreover, extensive literature( Spasiano, 2003) has shed light on 
the fact that the necessity of tackling the needs of the general public in a 
real way, when compared to the past, now entails a profound 
streamlining of the relationship between organisation and legislative 
regulation. 
All this increases the risk of moulding managerial activity into an 
executive process of legal provision with a dual implication: to trigger 
inevitable processes of avoiding responsibility towards the general public 
(including those subjects that have to express the organisational logic and 
the structures themselves); to throw open the doors of management to a 
possible judicial inquiry. In this way there would be a risk of applying 
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juridical-formal logic, a jurisdictional evaluation for a subject that 
requires profoundly diversified analytical parameters. 
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CHAPTER  IV 
 
A SYSTEM DYNAMICS APPROACH TO EVALUATE THE LEVEL OF 
AUTONOMY OF PUBLIC MANAGERS 
 
 
 
                   Introduction 
This chapter will use a system dynamics approach in order to verify if , 
despite to the problematic issues mentioned in the above chapters, the 
discipline introduced by the reform has been really able to ensure a 
greater autonomy to  public managers.  
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System dynamics is a methodology and computer simulation modeling 
technique for framing, understanding, and discussing complex issues and 
problems. It is an aspect of systems theory as a method for understanding 
the dynamic behavior of complex systems.  
The basis of the method is the recognition that the structure of any 
system — the many circular, interlocking, sometimes time-delayed 
relationships among its components — is often just as important in 
determining its behavior as the individual components themselves. 
The system dynamics approach consists on the definition of problems 
dynamically by identifying of independent stocks in the system and their 
inflows and outflows, and on the formulation of a behavioral model 
capable of reproducing, by itself, the dynamic problem of concern. 
Originally developed in the 1950s to help corporate managers improve 
their understanding of industrial processes, system dynamics is currently 
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being used throughout the public and private sector for policy analysis 
and design. 
In particular, the application of system dynamics in the public sector 
requires three main ‘levels’ of analysis: (1) a political (or macro level); (2) 
a managerial (or micro level) and (3) a political vs. managerial 
conversation (or meso level)( Bianchi, 2010). 
This work by using a system dynamics approach aims to verify the level 
of autonomy ensured by the reform to public executives. 
 
               1. Autonomy : Concept and measure in the public administration 
The concept of autonomy in the public sector is represented by the level 
of discretion that public managers have in making decisions. 
It is assumed, with the aim to evaluate the level of managers’ autonomy, 
that greater is the number of competences assigned to public executives 
in the adoption of certain decisions and greater it will be their 
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autonomy( Ongaro, 2007). The process through which the administration 
may obtained such competences may be the result of a precise legislative 
provision, or it can depends on a formal or informal delegation or on an 
established practice. 
 This chapter aims to analyze the level  of autonomy of public managers 
recognized by the normative introduced by the reform. 
In order to allow a measurement of the level of autonomy this concept 
has been fixed along three dimensions: autonomy in the management of 
human resources, autonomy in the management of instrumental 
resources and autonomy in the management of financial resources. 
 Each of these dimensions has been split on two levels. The first level is 
represented by the strategic level, that concerns the possibility for 
executives to make autonomously choices that affect firmly the 
organizational structure and that concern the definition of long-term 
goals. The second level in represented by the operational level, which is 
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linked to managerial choices and that concerns the combination of 
resources and the individuation of the modality of defining and pursuing 
short-term objectives. 
For each level we have defined indexes that allow to measure the 
position of public managers in relation to the specific level analyzed.  
Highlight to the above considerations we have individuated the 
following set of indicators: 
 • strategic autonomy in personnel management; 
 • operational autonomy in personnel management; 
 • strategic financial autonomy; 
 • operational financial autonomy; 
 . strategic instrumental autonomy; 
 • operational instrumental autonomy. 
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2.Dimensions of the autonomy 
This chapter, as above shown, individuates three main dimensions of 
managers’ autonomy with the aim to measure the general level of autonomy 
recognized by the discipline introduced by the reform. 
The first profile is represented by the autonomy of managers in the choice 
and management of human resources. It consists on the definition of the 
quantity and quality of the human resources; on the selection of resources; on 
the definition and assignment of tasks; on the personnel evaluation; on the 
assignment of incentives and on the disciplinary power. 
The second profile is represented by the autonomy of managers in the choice 
and management of instrumental resources. 
The last profile is represented by the autonomy in the choice and 
management of financial resources which consists on the budget definition 
and tariffs determination. 
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3.Public management regulation and its effect on managers’ autonomy 
D.p.r 748/72  
The presidential decree n. 748/72 aimed to recognize precise 
competences in managers, but it did not face the hierarchical relationship 
which linked public executives and politicians. The political authorities 
were able to influence management activities through their power to lay 
down precise instructions for managers, their power of revocation and 
modification of a manager’s actions and  their power to  substitute the 
manager in the execution of his or her duties.  
This situation led to inefficiency in public management and an improper 
allocation and use of resources.  
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Legislative Decree 29/93 ; 
The Italian legislator with this measure aimed to introduced private 
management tools into the public sector with a view to improving  its 
efficiency, effectiveness and financial stability. 
In particular with regard to the relationship between politicians and 
public managers, the decree 29/93 aimed to give public managers the 
same powers as private company managers  by ensuring to management a 
greater autonomy from political bodies. In fact on this regard the 
previous regulation recognized in politicians the power to influence 
managerial action considerably. 
The legislative decree n. 29 /93 stipulated a clear distribution of skills 
between politicians (orientation competences) and executives 
(management competences) and modified the hierarchical relationship 
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between them through the elimination of the above-mentioned powers , 
which allowed politicians to influence managerial activity.  
The objectives of the reform were finally implemented by the legislative 
decree 80/98, which extended the innovations to all managerial 
positions, and by the legislative decree 165/01, which coordinated and 
regulated all provisions concerning public employees. 
   Legislative decree 165/01 and Legislative decree 150/09  
A) Effects on the autonomy in the choice and management of human 
resources 
Definition of quantity and quality of the human resources.  
In order to the first profile of autonomy above considered, concerning 
the autonomy in the choice and management of human resources, this 
work analyzes what kind of autonomy the discipline ensures to managers 
in the definition of  the quantity and quality of the human resources.  
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On this regard the decree 150/09 introduces new provisions that increase 
the level of autonomy of public managers. 
These are the art. 6 co. 4-bis. which provides that managers individuate 
professional profiles necessary to carry out their institutional  tasks with 
the aim to prepare the planning of the personnel requirements ; and the 
art. 16 co 1 lett. a bis which stipulates that managers propose resources 
and professional profiles necessary to carry out the tasks of the structure.  
On the contrary, the legislative decree 165/01 introduced a provision 
which engraved negatively on managers’ autonomy. In fact the art. 4 co. 
1 lett. c) of the legislative decree 165/01  provided that politicians have 
the competence in order to the individuation of human, material and 
financial resources to assign to managerial structures . 
Selection of resources 
About the selection of resources and the conferment of managerial 
appointment a positive effect on managers’ autonomy is produced by the 
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art. 19 co. 5  of the d.lgs 165/01 which stipulates that the manager having 
a general managerial position confers the managerial appointment to 
managers assigned to his office. 
However there are also some norms of the same decree which engrave 
negatively on manager autonomy. These are the art. 19 co. 4 that allows 
politicians to confer general managerial positions; the art. 19 co. 6 which 
allows politicians to confer managerial appointments to external 
managers and, lastly, the art. 19 co. 8 which provides the spoil system for 
top management positions. 
 
Definition and assignment of tasks  
The d.lgs 165/01 engraves positively on this profile  because the art. co. 1 
lett.b) stipulates that general managers confer to simple manager the 
appointments and the responsibility of specific projects, define the goals 
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that simple managers have to achieve and assign the consequential 
resources. 
Personnel evaluation 
In order to this profile the discipline introduced by the reform increase 
the autonomy of public managers. On this regard the art. 16 co. 1 lett. e) 
of d.lgs 165/01 statues that general managers run, coordinate and check 
the activities of simple managers. 
Moreover the d.lgs 150/09  has introduced a new prevision , the art. 17 
co. 1 lett. e-bis) which  provides that managers carry out the evaluation 
of personnel assigned to their offices .  
Incentives and career growth of managers 
On this regard the decree 150/09 introduce a provision that increase the 
managers’ autonomy, this is the art. 17 co. 1 lett. e-bis) which provides 
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that managers carry out evaluation of personnel assigned to own offices 
in order to correspond benefits and merit award. 
On the other hand, about the profile of career growth of the professional 
executives the d.lgs 165/01 contains provisions that decrease managers’ 
autonomy. In fact the art. 23 states that only managers who have held a 
general managerial position or equivalent duties for at least three years, 
may be incorporated on the higher managerial level. 
Actually a position conferred by politicians (who have the power to 
confer top manager and general manager positions) might have direct 
consequences on  the manager’s career progression. 
Disciplinary power 
About this profile the d.lgs 150/09 increase managers’ autonomy by 
introducing two new provisions ( the article 55 bis  and the article 55 
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quater) which allow public manager to inflict to personnel of his office 
several sanctions such as fines, disciplinary lay-off and dismissal.     
                                                                                                                                                                                
B)Effect on the autonomy in the choice and management of instrumental 
resources 
About this aspect the d.lgs 165/01 contains provisions that engrave 
negatively on managers’ autonomy. 
In fact the art. 4 co. 1 lett c)  statues that politicians have the competence 
to individuate instrumental resources to destine to managerial structure,  
while the art. 17 co. 1 lett e) provides that managers have only the 
competence to manage the resources assigned to their structures. 
 
C) Effect on the autonomy in the choice and management of financial 
resources 
Budget definition 
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Under this profile the d.lgs 165 /01 contains provisions that engrave 
negatively on managers’ autonomy. 
In fact the art. 4 co. 1 lett c)  statues that politicians have the competence 
to individuate financial resources to destine to managerial structure , 
while the art. 17 co. 1 lett e) provides that managers have only the 
competence to manage the financial resources assigned to their 
structures. 
Tariffs determination 
On this regard the d.lgs 165/01 contains a provision that decreases the 
autonomy of professional executives. 
Actually the art. 4 co. 1 lett d) statues that politicians have the 
competence to define tariffs and fees which engrave on outside parties. 
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4.A  system dynamics approach to evaluate the effect of the normative on  
managers’ autonomy 
Highlight of the above mentioned provisions which engrave both 
positively and negatively on managers’ autonomy this chapter use a 
system dynamics approach in order to verify its assumption about the 
inadequacy of the discipline introduced by the reform to ensure a greater 
managerial autonomy to public executives. 
a)  What is system dynamics  ? 
System Dynamics is a computer based approach for modeling complex 
physical and social systems and experimenting with the models to design 
policies for improved performance. A model embodies a theory 
explaining internal dynamics of an abstract system built around a 
problem.  
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The basic elements of a system dynamics model are stocks, flows and 
feedback loops. Stocks are things that accumulate whole flows are the 
movement of things into or out of a stock. 
Feedback loops convey information about the level in a stock, for 
example, that might that might change a rate of flow or alter some other 
element in a system. 
The implementation of system dynamics to address specific problems 
involves several carefully designed steps aimed at creating a clear 
understanding of the problem as well as the possibilities for system 
improvement. These steps include: 1) representation of a pattern of 
trends portraying the problem, for example, changes in flow rates or 
changes in the level of a stock, 2) identification of a causal map that 
qualitatively describes how the problem is created, 3) articulation of the 
decision relationships underlying the causal map into a computer model  
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4) experimentation with the model to learn about the problem and the 
possible ways to mitigate it. 
The modeling process can be as important at the model itself. This 
process assists people in identifying their assumptions and testing their 
beliefs and assertions about causal relationships in complex systems.  
b) Applying System Dynamics in the Public Sector 
As above mentioned, although system dynamics’ main presence is 
arguably in the area of business, the public sector has also been a highly 
fruitful area of application. The public sector has particular features and 
problems which are well suited to system dynamics-based work.  
The application of system dynamics in the public sector requires three 
main ‘levels’ of analysis: (1) a political (or macro level); (2) a managerial 
(or micro level) and (3) a political vs. managerial conversation (or meso 
level)( Bianchi, 2010). 
184 
 
According to Bianchi “ Macro ‘level’ applications of SD focus the 
perspective of political actors. They could be referred to: (a) an ‘inter-
institutional’ or (b) an ‘institutional’ context. 
While the inter-institutional context implies that a player in a given 
institution undertakes a strategic dialogue with other players in other 
institutions, the institutional context implies that a player undertakes a 
strategic dialogue with other players operating in the same institution 
where he (or she) operates.  
Micro ‘level’ applications of SD focus the perspective of management. 
Relevant fields for SD modelling in this area are related to mapping 
‘products’ and processes, strategic resources and results, with the aim to 
foster performance improvement at departmental or inter-departmental 
level.  
The meso level analysis is related to the strategic conversation between 
politicians and managers. Such strategic conversation is a crucial aspect 
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in the public sector, for both the implementation and the design of 
policies. Lack of strategic conversation between the political and 
managerial role is likely to generate a kind of ‘administrative 
schizophrenia’. In fact, the setting of managerial objectives, actions and 
targets should imply a deep understanding and communication of the 
strategies outlined by the political level. On the other hand, the design 
and assessment of policies cannot ignore the emerging problems and 
opportunities that can be better perceived on a managerial level 
(Boyle,1999). 
Highlight the above considerations about system dynamics and its 
application in public sector, this chapter is going to use a system 
dynamics approach for evaluating the level of autonomy recognized by 
the new discipline to public executives .  
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C)  Model structure of  the level of autonomy of public manager 
recognized by the reform  
This section contains a detailed discussion of each the components of the 
model and an explanation of how they could replicate the problematic  
concerning the level of autonomy of public manager recognized by the 
reform . 
The structure hypothesis is based on the relation between the two main 
phenomena of the contest: the provisions introduced by the reform 
which reduce the deficit of autonomy of public managers and the 
provisions introduced by the reform which instead produce a limitations 
of this autonomy. 
In fact the model structure considers on one hand, the dispositions 
producing an increase of the level of autonomy and on the other hand , 
the provisions producing a decrease of the level of managers’ autonomy. 
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As shown in the figure below the structure presents four balancing loops 
and four reinforcing loops. 
Balancing loops ( b1,b2,b3,b4) represent those norms which aim to 
increase managers’ autonomy reducing the deficit of autonomy existing 
in the Italian public administration. However these balancing feedbacks 
brake the growth of the level of autonomy which the reform aimed to  
recognize to managers and for this reason they do not allow to achieve 
the goal of the reform to ensure a greater autonomy to managers. 
This result depends also on reinforcing loops ( r1,r2,r3,r4) present in the 
system. Actually reinforcing loops represent those norms which 
introduce a limitations of  the autonomy of managers in the choice and 
management of human, instrumental and financial resources. These 
reinforcing feedbacks enhance the deficit of managers’ autonomy  and 
avoid , at the same time, the growth of the level of autonomy . 
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The stock and flow structure shown in the figure below illustrates such 
behaviour of the structure. The graph shows that the level of autonomy 
concretely recognized by the reform does not achieve the desired level of 
autonomy which the reform aimed to ensure to public managers. 
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              Conclusions 
On the basis of the above-mentioned findings, we might conclude that 
the new regulation introduced by the reform has not fully accomplished 
its aims especially since it was not well designed by the legislator . 
In fact the reform of Italian public administration has concentrated on 
improving public action performances by a regulation of public 
management and the connected introduction of two key words: 
autonomy and accountability.  
This meant that managers should be endowed of greater autonomy in the 
execution of their managerial activities and, at the same time, they are 
fully responsible for both personnel’s and whole body’s performance. 
Nevertheless, highlight to the above considerations, enforced by results 
obtained by using system dynamics approach, it may be stated that the 
191 
 
reform of the Italian public administration did not completely 
accomplish its two fundamental goals.  
First of all, it did not recognize a greater autonomy to managers, 
considering that in the Italian system there are many instruments which 
can be used by politicians to affect managers’ executive action and, on 
the other hand, it has provided a managers’ performance evaluation 
system which is not compliant to the reality.  
For these reasons, we suggest a legislative innovation aimed at rectifying 
the ambiguities introduced by the new regulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
192 
 
REFERENCES  
ALESSE, R., La dirigenza dello Stato tra politica e amministrazione, Torino: 
Giappichelli, 2006. 
ALLEGRETTI, U., Imparzialità e buon andamento della pubblica amministrazione, 
1993, Diritto Discipline Pubblicistiche, 3.  
ANSELMI, L. (1994, August) Interesse pubblico, criteri di economicità e 
privatizzazioni, Azienda Pubblica(2), 381-391. 
BARRERA P. , Limiti della potestà legislativa dello Stato e riforma del lavoro 
pubblico, su: www.astrid.eu. 
BASSANINI F., Indirizzo politico, imparzialità della P.A. e autonomia della 
dirigenza. Principi costituzionali e disciplina legislativa, in Nuova Rassegna, 2008, n. 
21/22, pp. 2257-2270 
BASSANINI F., Vent’anni di riforme nel sistema amministrativo italiano (1990-
2010), in Rassegna ASTRID- di martedì 23 febbraio 2010 - n. 109 (numero 4/2010). 
193 
 
BATTINI,  S., In morte del principio di distinzione fra politica e amministrazione: la 
Corte preferisce lo spoils system, 2006 ,  Giornale di  diritto amministrativo, 6. 
BATTINI S., Un vero datore di lavoro per il settore pubblico: politico o 
amministrativo, in Gior. Dir. Amm., 2009, p. 475 ss.; V. TALAMO, Pubblico e 
privato nella egge delega per la riforma del lavoro pubblico, in Gior. Dir. Amm., 
2009, p. 468 ss. 
BERTI, L. (1998) Affari di fine secolo: le privatizzazioni in Italia. Citoyens (Roma, 5.  
BIANCHI, C., ( 2004), Sistemi di programmazione e controllo per l’azienda Regione, 
Milano, Giuffrè, 163. 
BIANCHI, C.,( 2010)  Improving Performance and Fostering Accountability in the 
Public Sector through System Dynamics Modelling: From an ‘External’ to an 
‘Internal’ Perspective, Syst. Res. 27, 361- 384(2010), Published online inWiley 
InterScience, 
BIANCHI, M. (1994, August) Difficoltà e fallimenti delle privatizzazioni in Italia: 
considerazioni e casi di patologia organizzativa, Azienda Pubblica(2), 345-379. 
194 
 
BOYLE R. 1999. The Management of Cross-Cutting Issues.Discussion Paper no. 8, 
Committee for Public Management Research, Institute of Public Administration, 
Dublin. 
BOLOGNINO D., La dirigenza pubblica statale tra autonomia e responsabilità , cit., 
220-223; G. NICOSIA, La valutazione dei dirigenti nel prisma dei poteri di revoca e 
recesso del datore di lavoro: l’interpretazione della giurisprudenza, in I sistemi di 
valutazione della dirigenza nelle pubbliche amministrazioni dello Stato, in I sistemi 
di valutazione della dirigenza nelle pubbliche amministrazioni dello Stato, Centro di 
ricerca sulle amministrazioni pubbliche “V. Bachelet” (a cura di), Roma, 2005,123–
142 
BOLOGNINO D., “Garanzia e tutela del dirigente pubblico attraverso il rispetto dei 
criteri di conferimento dell’incarico”: nota alla sentenza della Corte di Cassazione, 14 
aprile 2008, n. 9814, su LPA, 2008, n. 5, pagg. 845-860. 
195 
 
BORGONGELLI F., La responsabilità disciplinare del dipendente pubblico, in L. 
ZOPPOLI (a cura di), Ideologia e tecnica nella riforma del lavoro pubblico, Napoli, 
2009, 431. 
BORGONOVI, E., ( 2005), Principi e sistemi aziendali per le amministrazioni 
pubbliche, V ed., Milano, Egea.EDIESSE). 
BORINS, S. (1998) Lessons from the New Public Management in Commonwealth 
nations, International Public Management Journal, 1(1), 37-58. 
BOSCATI A., Dirigenza pubblica: poteri e responsabilità tra organizzazione del 
lavoro e svolgimento dell’attività amministrativa, in LPA, 2009, 46. In senso 
favorevole alla configurazione di indipendenza dell’Organismo in questione si può 
leggere S. BATTINI B. CIMINO, La valutazione della performance nella riforma 
Brunetta, cit. p. 265-266 
CAPANO, G., L’improbabile riforma. Le politiche di riforma amministrativa 
nell’Italia repubblicana, Bologna: Il Mulino,2009. 
CARINCI,  F.,  La privatizzazione del pubblico impiego alla prova del terzo Governo 
196 
 
Berlusconi: dalla l. n. 133/,2008 alla l.d. n. 15/2009, 2009,  WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo 
D’Antona. 
CASSESE,  S. , La dirigenza di vertice tra politica e amministrazione: un contributo 
alla riflessione.  2005, Il Lavoro nelle pubbliche amministrazioni. 
CASSESE,  S., Il rapporto tra politica e amministrazione e la disciplina della 
dirigenza, 2003,  Il Lavoro nelle pubbliche amministrazioni. 
CLARICH, M. (1994, August) I contesti istituzionali delle privatizzazioni tra 
progetto e realtà, Azienda Pubblica(2), 189-195. 
CHRISTENSEN, T. E P. LAEGREID (1998), “Administrative Reform Policy: the Case 
of Norway”, International Review of Administrative Science, 64: 457-475 
COLOMBO,  P., L’intervento del ministro sugli atti di gestione, Rimini, 2004. 
COMINELLI, L. (2005), Il Mediatore europeo, ombudsman dell'Unione. Risoluzione 
alternativa delle dispute tra cittadini e istituzioni comunitarie, Milano, Giuffrè. 
CORSO,  G. , FARES,  G. , Quale spoil system dopo la sentenza 103 della Corte 
costituzionale ? , 2007, www.giustamm.it. 
197 
 
CORTE DEI CONTI, Relazione sul rendiconto generale dello Stato per l’anno 2006. 
CLUB DIRIGENTI P.A., Riorganizzazioni o spoils system?”, [ Online] at http:// 
www.uilpadirigentiministeriali.com, accessed  July 22 st, 2009 
D’ALESSIO G., Il disegno della dirigenza, cit., 64 – 65; F. BORGONGELLI, La 
responsabilità disciplinare del dipendente pubblico, in L. ZOPPOLI (a cura di), 
Ideologia e tecnica nella riforma del lavoro pubblico, Napoli, 2009, 431. 
D’ALESSIO G. , BOLOGNINO D. , Il dirigente come soggetto “attivo” e “passivo” 
della valutazione. La responsabilità dirigenziale legata al sistema di valutazione e la 
responsabilità per omessa vigilanza su produttività ed efficienza, in corso di 
pubblicazione 
D’ALESSIO,  G.,  “La dirigenza pubblica tra autonomia e responsabilità” , 2005, 
Roma, Centro di ricerca sulle pubbliche amministrazioni “V. Bachelet” della Luiss,. 
D’ALESSIO,  G., “Gli incarichi dirigenziali nel pubblico impiego privatizzato” 2006, 
Roma, Centro studi di diritto del lavoro “D. Napoletano” e Fondazione “Il diritto del 
lavoro ‘L.A. Miglioranzi’”. 
198 
 
D’ALESSIO,  G. , Il disegno della dirigenza, ritorno al passato? Roma: Ediesse, 2009. 
D’ALESSIO,  G. , Nuove norme sulla dirigenza: il legislatore miope e le voci amiche, 
2005, Il lavoro nelle pubbliche amministrazioni, V 3. 
D’ALESSIO,  G., La disciplina della dirigenza pubblica: profili critici ed  ipotesi di 
revisione del quadro normativo, 2009, Il lavoro nelle pubbliche amministrazioni, V 
2. 
D’ALESSIO, G., VALENSISE,  B. , Incarichi di funzioni dirigenziali,  Il lavoro nelle 
pubbliche amministrazioni, V, 2.  
D’ORTA , C., Gli incarichi dirigenziali nello Stato dopo la legge 145/2002, 2002,  Il 
lavoro nelle pubbliche amministrazioni, V. 4. 
FERLIE, E., ASHBURNER, L., FITZGERALD, L. & PETTIGREW, A. (1996) The 
New Public Management in Action (Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress). 
FORTE, P. , Il principio di distinzione tra politica e amministrazione, Torino: 
Giappichelli, 2005. 
199 
 
GAGLIARDUCCI F., TARDIOLA A., Verifica dei risultati dell’azione amministrativa 
e valutazione dei dirigenti: profili strutturali, funzionali e retributivi, in ASTRID, 
L’amministrazione come professione. I dirigenti pubblici tra spoils system e servizio 
ai cittadini, G. D’ALESSIO (a cura di), Bologna, 2008, 159-165. 
GARDINI,  G. , Spoil system all’italiana: mito o realtà?, 2002,  Il lavoro nelle 
pubbliche amministrazioni,  V. 2. 
GARDINI,  G., Lo spoils system al primo vaglio di legittimità: le nomine fiduciarie 
delle    Regioni sono legittime, ma la querelle resta aperta,  2006,  Il lavoro nelle 
pubbliche amministrazioni, 2006,  3-4. 
GUYOMARCH, A. (1999), “'Public Service', 'Public Management' and the 
'Modernization' of French Public Administration”, Public Administration, 77 (1): 
171-193. 
HOOD, C. (1995) “The ‘New Public Management’ in the 1980s: Variations on a 
Theme”, Accounting, Organizations and Society 20(2/3), pp. 93–109 
200 
 
HOOD, C. (1991, Spring) A public management for all seasons? Public 
Administration (special issue on "The New Public Management," edited by R. A. W. 
Rhodes), 69(1), 3-19. 
HOOD, C. (1995a, Spring) Emerging issues in public administration, Public 
Administration, 73, 165-183. 
JORGENSEN, T. B. (1996), “From continental law to Anglo-Saxon behaviorism: 
Scandinavian public administration”, Public Administration Review, 56 (1): 94-103. 
KICKERT, W. J. M. (1995), “Public governance in the Netherlands. An alternative to 
Anglo-American managerialism”, Administration and Society, 26. 
LEINO, P. (2004), “The Wind is in the North. The First European Ombudsman 
(1995-2003)”, European Public Law, 10 (2): 333-368. 
LO SCHIAVO, L. (2000), “Quality Standards in the Public Sector: Differences 
between Italy and the UK in the Citizen's Charter Intitiative”, Public 
Administration, 78 (3): 679-698. 
201 
 
MAINARDI S., La responsabilità dirigenziale, in La nuova disciplina della dirigenza 
pubblica, Roma, 2003, 57. 
MARCON, G. (1996, August) Il controllo di gestione nel nuovo ordinamento 
finanziario e contabile degli enti locali, Azienda Pubblica(2), 273-309. 
MARCON, G. (1997, 25-26 September) Italy's local government budget reform: a 
managerial drive bounded by bureaucratic hysteresis. ESRC/CIMA Workshop 
(Edinburgh). 
MARCON, G. & PANOZZO, F. (1998) Reforming the reform: changing roles for 
accounting and management in the Italian health care sector, The European 
Accounting Review, 7(2), 185-208. 
MERLONI F., Dirigenza pubblica e amministrazione imparziale.Il modello italiano 
in Europa, Bologna, il Mulino, 2006. 
MERLONI, F., Distinzione tra politica e amministrazione e spoils system, in Merloni   
“l’amministrazione sta cambiando?,  Milano: Giuffrè, 2007. 
MERUSI, F. (2002), Le leggi del mercato: innovazione comunitaria e autarchia 
202 
 
nazionale, Bologna, Il Mulino. 
MESSORI, M., PADOAN, P. C. & ROSSI, N. (1998) Proposte Per l'Economia Italiana 
(Roma, Editori Laterza). 
MORCIANO M., La “trasparenza” nella delega al Governo finalizzata 
all'ottimizzazione della produttività del lavoro pubblico e sulla contrattazione, su: 
www.amministrazioneincammino.luiss.it; 
MORTATI, C. (1974), L'ombudsman: (il difensore civico), Torino, UTET. 
MUSSARI, R. (1994a) Il Management Delle Aziende Pubbliche: Profili Teorici 
(Padova, CEDAM). 
NASCHOLD, F. (1996) New Frontiers in Public Sector Management: Trends and 
Issues in State and Local Government in Europe (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter). 
NATALINI A., Controlli interni: la terza riforma, in M. GENTILE (a cura di), Lavoro 
pubblico: ritorno al passato? La legge Brunetta su produttività e 
contrattazione,Roma, Ediesse, 2009. 
NESPOR, S. , Conferimento di incarichi dirigenziali presso l’amministrazione dello 
203 
 
Stato: criteri e limiti secondo la giurisprudenza della Corte dei Conti, 2006,  RIP. 
ONGARO, E. ( 2007), L'organizzazione dello stato tra autonomia e policy capacity 
(Analisi e strumenti per l'innovazione), Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino. 
OSBORNE, D. & GAEBLER, T. (1993) Reinventing Government: How the 
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (New York, PLUME, 
Penguin Books USA Inc.). 
PETERS, B. G. (1996), The Future of Governing: Four Emerging Models, Lawrence, 
University Press of Kansas. 
PETERS, B. G. (1997), “Policy Transfers between Governments: the Case of 
Administrative Reforms”, West European Politics, 20 (4): 71-89. 
PETERS, B. G. E J. PIERRE (1998), “Governance without government? Rethinking 
public administration”, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8 (2): 
223-244. 
PREFORMS, R. (1998), “Reshaping the Democratic State: Swedish Experiences in a 
Comparative Perspective”, Public Administration, 76 (Spring): 141–159. 
204 
 
PONTI,  B., La nozione di indipendenza nel diritto pubblico come condizione del 
funzionario, 2006 ,  Diritto pubblico, 1. 
REBORA G., Chi gestirà il cambiamento, in Risorse Umane, 2009, p. 137 ss. 
RHODES, R. A. W. (1997), Understanding governance. Policy networks, 
governance, reflexivity and accountability, Buckingam, Open University Press. 
SATTA , F., Imparzialità della pubblica amministrazione, 1989, Enciclopedia 
Giuridica. 
SANTUCCI R., MORA P., Valorizzazione del merito e metodi di incentivazione 
della produttività e della qualità della prestazione lavorativa, in L. ZOPPOLI (a cura 
di), Ideologia e tecnica nella riforma del lavoro pubblico, Napoli, 2009, 302 e 304. 
SCHEDLER, K. (1997), “The state of public management reforms in Switzerland”, 
Public Management and Administrative Reform in Western Europe, W. J. M. 
Kickert, Edward Elgar. 
SPASIANO M.R., Funzione amministrativa e legalità di risultato, Torino, 
Giappichelli, 2003 
205 
 
TALAMO V. (2007), “Per una dirigenza pubblica riformata”, in Dell’Aringa,Della 
Rocca (a cura di), pp. 119-166 , Soveria Mannellli, Rubbettino, 2007 
TALAMO, V., Lo spoils system all’italiana  fra legge Bassanini e legge Frattini, 2003, 
Il lavoro nelle pubbliche amministrazioni. 
TALAMO, V., Il lavoro pubblico dieci anni dopo la privatizzazione: conflittualità, 
tendenze, prospettive, in Talamo, “ La riforma del lavoro pubblico: progressioni di 
carriera e relazioni collettive “,  Milano: Ipsoa, 2004. 
TALAMO V., La dirigenza di vertice tra politica ed amministrazione, 2005,  Forum 
della  pubblica amministrazione. 
TOMKINS, A. (2000), “Transparency and the Emergence of a European 
Administrative Law’”, Yearbook of European Law, 19: 217-256. 
TORRES, L. (2004), “Trajectories in public administration reforms in European 
Continental countries”, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 63 (3): 99-112. 
TORRES, L. E V. PINA (2004), “Reshaping Public Administration: the Spanish 
Experience Compared to the UK”, Public Administration, 82 (2): 445-464. 
206 
 
WOLLMANN, H. (2001), “Germany’s trajectory of public sector modernisation: 
continuities and discontinuities”, Policy & Politics, 29 (2): 151–170. 
ZOPPOLI  L., A dieci anni dalla riforma Bassanini: dirigenza e personale, in 
Lav.Pub. Amm., p. 1 ss., 2008; L. BORDOGNA, Per una maggiore autonomia 
dell’alta dirigenza pubblica: una proposta, in WP Massimo D’Antona, n. 92/2009, 
inwww.lex.unict.it 
